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ບົດສັງລວມ 
 
ຈຸດປະສົງຂອງເອກະສານຫຍໍ້ຂອງ
ນະໂຍບາຍນີ້ແມ່ນເພື່ອອກຳ
ນົດຫາບັນດາປັດໃຈທີ່ເປັນໄດ້
ທີ່ເປັນສາເຫດທີ່ພາໃຫ້ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າໃນບໍ່ດົນຜ່ານມາສູງ
ຂຶ້ນ ແລະ ສະເໜີທາງເລືອກ
ຕ່າງ ໆ ເພື່ອຄຸ້ມຄອງລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າບໍ່ໃຫ້ປ່ຽນແປງຢ່າງ
ໄວວາໃນອະນາຄົດ.  ໃນໄລຍະກາງປີ 
2010 ລາຄາເຂົ້າໜຽວຢູ່ລາວໄດ້
ເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນເກີນກວ່າ 50%.  ໃນ
ຄວາມເປັນຈິງ, ລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນປີ 
2010 ທີ່ສູງຂຶ້ນນັ້ນແມ່ນ
ເກີນກວ່າໄລຍະປີ 2006 ຫາ 2008 
ຊຶ່ງແມ່ນໄລຍະທີ່ເກີດວິ
ກິດການອາຫານໃນໂລກ.  ເຖິງ
ແມ່ນວ່າລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນຢູ່ໃນ
ສະພາບສະຫງົບໃນໄລຍະເຄ່ິງປີທຳ
ອີດຂອງປີ 2011 ກໍ່ຕາມແຕ່
ວ່າກໍ່ຍັງເປັນລາຄາທີ່ສູງ
ຢູ່ເມື່ອທຽບໃສ່ປະຫວັດສາດ
ທີ່ຜ່ານມາ.  ເອກະສານນະໂຍບາຍ
ສະບັບນີ້ມີຈຸດປະສົງຊອກຫາບ
ັນດາປັດໃຈທີ່ພາໃຫ້ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າສູງຂຶ້ນ ແລະ ໃຫ້ຄຳສະ
ເໜີແນະທາງດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍໃນ
ເບື້ອງຕົ້ນ.   
ເຂົ້າມີຄວາມສຳຄັນຫລາຍທີ່
ສຸດສຳລັບ ສປປ ລາວ.  ໃນຖານະທີ່
ເປັນອາຫານຫລັກ ເຂົ້າໜຽວຍັງ
ມີຄວາມສຳຄັນທາງດ້ານວັດທະນາ
ທຳ ແລະ ການເມືອງອີກດ້ວຍ.  
ເປັນທີ່ຄາດຄະເນວ່າຄົນລາວ
ຜູ້ໜຶ່ງບໍລິໂພກເຂົ້າສານ 
200 ກິໂລກຣາມຕໍ່ຄົນ ໃນ
ແຕ່ລະປີ ຊຶ່ງກວມເອົາ 70% ຂ
ອງອາຫານທີ່ເປັນທາດກາລໍຣີ 
ແລະ ໂປຣຕີນ1. 
ການຜະລິດເຂົ້າຢູ່ໃນລາວເປັນ
ແບບພໍກຸ້ມກິນ.  ມີພຽງປະມານ 
10% ຂອງການຜະລິດເຂົ້າເທົ່າ
ນັ້ນທີ່ໄດ້ເອົາໄປຂາຍໃນ
ຕະຫລາດ.  ການປູກເຂົ້າກວມ
ເອົາຫລາຍກວ່າ 80% ຂອງເນື້ອ
ທີ່ປູກຝັງທັງໝົດ.  ໃນດ້ານ
ພູມສາດເຫັນວ່າເຂົ້າປູກໄດ້
ຢູ່ທຸກພາກພື້ນຂອງປະເທດ 
ແຕ່ວ່າສ່ວນຫລາຍຈະຢູ່ໃນເຂດ
ທົ່ງນາຕາມທົ່ງພຽງຊື່ງເປັນ
ເຂດທີ່ຢູ່ໃກ້ຊາຍແດນຕິດ
ກັບປະເທດໄທ.  ການປູກເຂົ້າ
ສ່ວນຫລລາຍຈະແມ່ນເຂົ້າໜຽວ
ຢູ່ໃນ 3 ເຂດຫລັກຂອງລະບົບນິ
ເວດ: ເຂດທົ່ງພຽງທີ່ເຮັດນາ
ດ້ວຍນ້ຳຝົນ, ເຂດປູກເຂົ້າ
ໄຮ່, ແລະ ເຂດນາດ້ວຍນ້ຳ
ຊົນລະປະທານ. 
ການບັນລຸການຜະລິດເຂົ້າໃຫ້
ກຸ່ມກິນໃນລະດັບທົ່ວປະເທດ
ໄດ້ກາຍເປັນບຸລິມະສິດທີ່
ສຳຄັນອັນໜຶ່ງສຳລັບ
ລັດຖະບານ.  ເຖິງແມ່ນວ່າໄດ້ມີ
ການປັບປຸງໃນການຜະລິດ ແລະ 
ການເກັບກ່ຽວຜົນລະປູກເຂົ້າ 
                                                 
1 ເຂົ້າໜຽວຍັງຖືກໃຊ້ເຮັດເປັນ
ເສັ້ນເຝີ ແລະ ອາຫານປະເພດຂອງຫວານ
ຢ່າງຫລວງຫລາຍອີກດ້ວຍ. 
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ກໍ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ໝາຍເຖິງວ່າທຸກ
ຄອບຄົວຢູ່ໃນຊົນນະບົດຈະມີ
ເຂົ້າກຸ້ມກິນຕາມຄວາມຕ້ອ
ງການພໍລິໂພກຂອງຕົນ.  ເນື່ອງ
ຈາກວ່າເຂົ້າທີ່ເອົາໄປຂາຍໃນ
ຕະຫລາດມີຈຳນວນໜ້ອຍ ສປປ 
ລາວ ຈິ່ງມີຄວາມອ່ອນໄຫວຕໍ່
ການເໜັງຕິງຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າທີ່
ເກີດມາຈາກການຂາດແຄນການສະ
ໜອງເຂົ້າຢູ່ພາຍໃນປະເທດ ແລະ 
ການພັດທະນາການຄ້າໃນພາກ
ພື້ນ. 
ການສະໜອງເຂົ້າຢູ່ພາຍໃນປະ
ເທດ ແລະ ບັນດາປັດໃຈຄວາມ
ຕ້ອງການສາມາດອະທິບາຍໄດ້ພຽງ
ແຕ່ສ່ວນໜ້ອຍໜຶ່ງເທົ່າ
ນັ້ນຂອງການເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຂອງ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າໜຽວໃນປີ 2010.  ພວກ
ເຮົາໄດ້ພົບເຫັນວ່າການສະໜອງ
ເຂົ້າທີ່ບໍ່ພຽງພໍຢູ່ພາຍ
ໃນປະເທດອາດອະທິບາຍໄດ້ສ່ວນ
ໜ້ອຍໜຶ່ງເທົ່ານັ້ນຂອງການ
ເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າຊຶ່ງ
ຍັງບໍ່ທັນມີຄວາມແນ່ນອນບາງ
ດ້ານກ່ຽວກັບຂໍ້ມູນທາງດ້ານ
ບໍລິມາດການຜະລິດເຂົ້າ ແລະ 
ເຂດຜະລິດເຂົ້າພວກເຮົາໃນພົບ
ເຫັນວ່າທ່າອ່ຽງຂອງລະດູການ 
ແລະ ການຫລຸດລົງຂອງເຂົ້າທີ່
ເອົາໄປຂາຍໃນຕະຫລາດໃນປີ 2010 
ຂອງເຂົ້ານາປີທີ່ຫລຸດລົງ
ຍ້ອນສະພາບໄພແຫ້ງແລ້ງນັ້ນ
ກໍ່ຍັງບໍ່ສາມາດໃຫ້ເຫດຜົນ
ຢ່າງພຽງພໍຕໍ່ການເພີ່ມ
ຂຶ້ນຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າ.  ການວິເຄາະ
ຍັງຊີ້ໃຫ້ເຫັນວ່າມີການ
ສະໜອງເຂົ້າແບບໃຫ້ສິນເຊື່ອ 
ແລະ ມີການກະຕຸ້ນເຂົ້າຂອງ
ບັນດາໂຮງສີ. 
ການຄ້າເຂົ້າໃນພາກພື້ນອາດ
ເປັນສາເຫດຕົ້ນຕໍຂອງການ
ເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຂອງລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າໜຽວ.  ການວິເຄາະໄດ້ຊີ້
ໃຫ້ເຫັນວ່າການຄ້າໃນພາກ
ພື້ນພາໃຫ້ລາຄາເຂົ້າເພີ່ມ
ຂຶ້ນຊຶ່ງພາໃຫ້ລາຄາເຂົ້າ
ຢູ່ພາຍໃນປະເທດມີການປັ່ນ
ປ່ວນ ແລະ ການຕອບໂຕ້ທາງດ້ານ
ນະໂຍບາຍທາງການຄ້າທີ່ບໍ່
ທັນກັບສະພາບການ. 
ການຄ້າເຂົ້າກັບປະເທດ
ຫວຽດນາມອາດແມ່ນເຫດຜົນ
ຕົ້ນຕໍສຳລັບການເພີ່ມສູງ
ຂຶ້ນຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນໄລຍະສັ້ນ 
ໃນຄະນະທີ່ການຄ້າເຂົ້າກັບປະ
ເທດໄທໄດ້ມີຜົນກະທົບໃນໄລຍະ
ກາງ ແລະ ໄລຍະຍາວ.  ບັນດາຜູ້
ສົ່ງອອກເຂົ້າລາຍໃຫຍ່ທີ່
ເປັນທາງການທີ່ສົ່ງເຂົ້າໄປ
ຂາຍໃນຫວຽດນາມພາໃຫ້ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າສູງຂຶ້ນໃນປີ 2006 ແລະ 
2010.  ການວິເຄາະໄດ້ສະແດງໃຫ້
ເຫັນວ່າການເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຂອງ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າແມ່ນສູງທີ່ສຸດ
ຢູ່ໃນເຂດທີ່ມີການຄ້າເຂົ້າ
ກັບຫວຽດນາມ ແລະ  ໄທ.  ຢ່າງໃດ
ກໍ່ຕາມການຄິດໄລ່ສົມທຽມ
ໃສ່ລາຄາເຂົ້າໜຽວໃນຕະຫລາດ
ພາຍໃນປະເທດແມ່ນບໍ່ຄືກັນ
ເນື່ອງຈາກວ່າລາຄາເຂົ້າໄດ້
ເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຈາກບັນດາປະເທດ
ເພື່ອນບ້ານໄດ້ມີຜົນກະທົບ
ຢ່າງໄວວາຫລາຍກວ່າການຫລຸດ
ລົງຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າ.  ຂໍ້ມູນ
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ທີ່ພົບເຫັນສະເພາະຈາກການ
ຄົນຄວ້ານະໂຍບາຍນີ້ປະກອບມີ: 
 
 ເຂົ້າລາວເປັນທີ່ຕ້ອງການ
ຢູ່ປະເທດຫວຽດນາມ: ທັງນີ້
ກໍ່ເພາະວ່າພື້ນທີ່ການ
ຜະລິດທີ່ອຳນວຍຕໍ່ການ
ເກັບກ່ຽວ, ແລະ ມີຄວາມ
ຕ້ອງການເຂົ້າໜຽວຢ່າງ
ຫລວງຫລາຍສຳລັບໂອກາດພິເສດ
ສຳຄັນຕ່າງ ໆ.  ໃນຄວາມເປັນ
ຈິ່ງທີ່ວ່າໄລຍະທີ່ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າສູງຂຶ້ນແມ່ນກົງກັບ
ໄລຍະທີ່ມີການສົ່ງເຂົ້າ
ອອກຢ່າງຫລວງຫລາຍໄປ
ຫວຽດນາມທີ່ຖືກຕ້ອງເປັນ
ທາງການເຊິ່ງມັນພົວພັນ
ກັບການຕັດສິນບັນຫາທາງ
ດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍກາຍຄ້າໃນ
ລະດັບປະເທດ ແລະ ລະດັບແຂວງ
ຊຶ່ງມີຜົນຕໍ່ການ
ປະຕິບັດລາຄາເຂົ້າທີ່ມີ
ການປ່ຽນແປງຢູ່ເລື້ອຍ ໆ 
 
 ການຄ້າເຂົ້າກັບປະເທດໄທ
ກໍ່ມີຄວາມສຳຄັນເນື່ອງ
ຈາກຄວາມຕ້ອງການທີ່ຄ
້າຍຄືກັນສຳລັບ ເຂົ້າໜຽວ
ທີ່ເປັນອາຫານຫລັກ ເຖິງ
ແມ່ນວ່າຂໍ້ມູນກ່ຽວກັບ
ການຂາຍເຂົ້າໄປໄທໃນຕົວ
ຈິ່ງຍັງເປັນທີ່ບໍ່ສາມາດ
ເຊື່ອຖືໄດ້ກໍ່ຕາມ.  ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າເປືອກຂອງລາວຍັງຖືກ
ກວ່າລາຄາເຂົ້າເປືອກຂອງໄທ
ໃນເວລາຂາຍອອກຈາກທົງນາໃນ
ຂະນະທີ່ລາຄາເຂົ້າສານໜຽວ
ຂອງລາວແພງກວ່າຂອງໄທອັນ
ເນື່ອງມາຈາກຄ້າສີເຂົ້າ
ແພງກວ່າ.  ດັ່ງນັ້ນຈິງມີ
ຄວາມຈຸງໃຈໃນການສົ່ງອອກ
ເຂົ້າເປືອກ. 
 
ການວິເຄາະລະອຽດກ່ຽວກັບລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າຢູ່ໃນລາວຍັງຖືກຈຳກກັດ
ຍ້ອນການຂາດຂ້ໍມູນຂອງການ
ຄ້າເຂົ້າຢູ່ໃນລະດັບພາກ
ພື້ນ.  ມີຄວາມເປັນໄປໄດ້ທີ່
ວ່າການຂາດເຂົ້າສະໜອງຕະຫລາດ
ອາດຈະເປັນບັນຫາທີ່
ກ່ຽວຂ້ອງກັບລະດັບພາກພື້ນ
ຊຶ່ງມີຜົນກະທົບຕໍ່ລາວ, ໄທ 
ແລະ ຫວຽດນາມໄປພ້ອມ ໆ ກັນ.  
ດັ່ງການການວິເຄາະໃນອະນາຄົດ
ຄວນເບີ່ງທ່າອຽງການຜະລິດ
ເຂົ້າໜຽວໃນລະດັບພາກພຶ້ນ 
ແລະ ການຄ້າຂາຍເຂົ້າໜຽວ
ເພື່ອເຮັດການປະເມີນຂອບເຂດ
ຂອງຜົນກະທົບທີ່ສາມາດ
ອະທິບາຍເຫດຜົນຕໍ່ການປ່ຽນ
ແປງຂອງລາເຂົ້າຢ່າງໄວວາຢູ່ໃນ
ລາວ.  ທັງນີ້ກະເພາະວ່າການຄ້າ
ເຂົ້າອາດເປັນຕົ້ນເຫດອັນ
ໜຶ່ງຂອງການພຸ່ງຂຶ້ນຂອງ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າຂອງລາວດັ່ງທີ່ໄດ້
ສະແດງໃຫ້ເຫັນຢູ່ໃນຂໍ້ມູນ
ທີ່ເກັບກຳໄດ້ຢູ່ໃນເອກະສານ
ສະບັບນີ້ແຕ່ວ່າການປ່ຽນແປງ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າຢ່າງໄວວາໃນປະເທດໄທ 
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ແລະ ປະເທດຫວຽດນາມ ແລະ ປັດໃຈ
ອື່ນ ໆທີ່ເປັນສາເຫດຂອງການ
ປ່ຽນແປງລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນບັນດາປະ
ເທດເພື່ອນບ້ານອາດເປັນສາເຫດ
ເບື່ອງຕົ້ນກໍ່ໄດ້. 
ການຕອບໂຕ້ທາງດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍ
ຂອງລັດຖະບານໃນປະຈຸບັນຕໍ່
ລາຄາເຂົ້າປະກອບດ້ວຍ (i) ການ
ຈຳກັດການສົ່ງອອກ, (ii) ການກັກ
ເຂົ້າໄວ້ຢູ່ໃນສາງ, ແລະ (iii) 
ແຜນການຕ່າງ ໆ ເພື່ອຄວບຄຸ້ມ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າໄລຍະຊົ່ວຄາວ.  ແຕ່
ຢ່າງໃດກໍ່ຕາມປະສິດທິຜົນ
ຂອງບັນດາມາດຕະການທາງດ້ານນະ
ໂຍບາຍນີ້ຍັງມີຫລັກສະນະປົນ
ເປກັນຢູ່.  ກ່ອນອື່ນນໝົດ
ລາຄາສົ່ງອອກເຂົ້າຂອງລາວໄດ້
ຖືກຈຳກັດໂດຍ ໂກຕ້າ ການສົ່ງ
ອອກ ແລະ ອາກອນ.  ອາດມີຄວາມ
ຂັດແຍ່ງກັນລະຫວ່າງນະໂຍບາຍ
ການຄ້າແຫ່ງຊາດ ແລະ ສິດທິ
ຂອງບັນດາແຂວງທີ່ຈະອອກ
ອະນຸຍາດໂກຕ່າສຳລັບການສົ່ງ
ອອກ.  ປະເດັນທີ ສອງ ກໍ່ຄື
ວ່າການເຂົ້າແຊກແຊງຂອງລັດ
ຖະບານເພື່ອຮັກສາລາຄາເຂົ້າ
ດ້ວຍການເກັບຊື້ເຂົາໄວ້ຢູ່
ໃນສາງອາດຈະເປັນວິທີການທີ່
ບໍ່ຄັກແນ່ປານໃດທ່າຈະເບີ່
ງຜົນປະໂຫຍດທີ່ມີຫລັກສະນະ
ຈຳກັດສຳລັບບັນດາໂຮງສີ.  ປະ
ເດັນທີ່ ສາມ ກໍ່ຄືວ່າການ
ຄວບຄຸມລາຄາອາດເປັນຜົນ
ກະທົບບໍ່ດີໄລຍະຍາວຕໍການ
ຜະລິດເຂົ້າ.  ປະສົບການສາກົນ
ໄດ້ສະແດງໃຫ້ເຫັນວ່າການເຂົ້າ
ແຊກແຊງໃນຫລັກສະນະດັ່ງກ່າວ
ນັ້ນມັກຈະເກີດຄວາມຫລົ້ມ
ເຫລວໃນການບັນລຸບັນດາເປົ້າ
ໝາຍທີ່ວາງໄວ້.  ໃນຄວາມເປັນ
ຈິງ ຍັງມີຄວາມສ່ຽງທີ່
ວ່າການແຊກແຊງໃນລັກສະນະ
ດັ່ງກ່າວອາດພາໃຫ້ເກີດຄວາມ
ບໍ່ແນ່ນອນຫລາຍຂຶ້ນຕໍ່
ຜູ້ຜະລິດ ແລະ ຜູ້ຄ້າຂາຍ
ຊຶ່ງສ້າງຄວາມຈຳກັດຕໍ່ການ
ລົງທຶນ, ການຜະລິດ ແລະ ຄວາມ
ຈຸງໃຈໃນການຄ້າ. 
ມັນມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນທີ່ຈະຕ້ອງ
ໄດ້ມີການປະສານງານຢ່າງໃກ້ຊິດ
ລະຫວ່າງການຜະລິດເຂົ້າ ແລະ ນະ
ໂຍບາຍທາງການຄ້າຢູ່ໃນລະດັບປະ
ເທດ ແລະ ລະດັບແຂວງເພື່ອ
ຄຸ້ມຄອງບໍ່ໃຫ້ປ່ຽນແປງລາຄາ
ຢ່າງໄວວາຢ່າງມີປະສິດທິຜົນ.  
ສິ່ງນີ້ອາດຮຽກຮ້ອງໃຫ້ມີ
ຄວາມຮູ້ດີ ແລະ ມີລະບົບຂໍ້
ມູນຂ່າວສານເພື່ອເປັນ
ພື້ນຖານໃຫ້ແກ່ການຕັດສິນ
ທາງດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍ.  ວິທີການ
ປະຕິບັດທີ່ສະເໜີໃຫ້ອາດ
ປະກອບດ້ວຍ: 
 
 ພັດທະນາຍຸດທະສາດສຳລັບຂະ
ແໜງການເຂົ້າ ແລະ ກອບວຽກ
ນະໂຍບາຍ.  ສິ່ງນີ້ຈະເປັນ
ພື້ນຖານສຳລັບການປະສານງານ 
ແລະ ການວາງແຜນສຳລັບການ
ລົງທຶນຂອງພາກສ່ວນລັດ 
ແລະ ເອກະຊົນເພື່ອສົ່ງ
ເສີມການຜະລິດເຂົ້າ.  ການ
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ເພີ່ມການຜະລິດ ແລະ ມີ
ເຂົ້າເຫລືອກິນອອກຂາຍຢູ່
ຕະຫລາດແມ່ນເງື່ອນໄຂທີ່
ຈຳເປັນສຳລັບສະຖຽນລະພາບຂອງ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນອະນາຄົດ2  ໂດຍ
ການເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນຂອງພົນລະ
ເມືອງລາວດ້ວຍອັດຕາ 2,2% 
ຕໍ່ປີ ຄວາມຕ້ອງການເຂົ້າ
ຄາດຄະເນວ່າຈະເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນໄປ
ຄຽງຄູ່ກັນຕາມການເວລາຊຶ່ງ
ມີຄວາມຕ້ອງການໃຫ້ເພີ່ມ
ການຜະລິດ ແລະ ການເກັບກ່ຽວ
ໃຫ້ສູງຂຶ້ນ.  ລະດັບຂອງລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າທີ່ສູງໃນປະຈຸບັນ
ເປັນທີ່ຄາດວ່າຍັງຈະຄົງ
ຢູ່ຕະຫລອດໄປແມ່ນໂອກາດ
ອັນໜຶ່ງສຳລບການພັດທະນາ
ຂອງຂະແໜງການເຂົ້າໃນລາວ.  
ການພັດທະນາຍຸດທະສາດອັນ
ຄົບຖ້ວນ ແລະ ກອບວຽກທາງ
ດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍຈະຊ່ວຍປະສານ
ງານໃຫ້ແກ່ການຜະລິດ, ການ
ສີເຂົ້າ ແລະ ການຕັດສິນ
ບັນຫາທາງດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍການ
ຄ້າເຂົ້າ.  ຄວາມສຳຄັນອີກ
ດ້ານໜຶ່ງກໍ່ຄືຈະຕ້ອງ
ໄດ້ເຮັດການປະສານງານ
ກ່ຽວກັບການຕັດສິນບັນ
                                                 
2 ການຄາດຄະເນຂອງລັດຖະບານແມ່ນເຮັດ
ໃຫ້ການຜະລິດເຂົ້າຄວນເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນ
ຈາກ 3 ລ້ານໂຕ້ນໃນປະຈຸບັນເປັນ 4,2 
ລ້ານໂຕ້ນພາຍໃນປີ 2015. 
ຫາດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍຢູ່ລະດັບ
ສູນກາງ, ແຂວງ ແລະ ເມືອງ ແລະ 
ແກ້ໄຂບັນຫາການຂາດຂໍ້
ມູນ.

 ສ້າງຕັ້ງໃຫ້ມີລະບົບການ
ຕິດຕາມລາຄາເຂົ້າຢ່າງມີ
ປະສິດທິຜົນ.  ລະບົບ
ດັ່ງກ່າວນີ້ຄວນຕິດຕາມ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າພາຍໃນປະເທດ ແລະ 
ລະດັບພາກພື້ນໄປພ້ອມກັນ, 
ຕິດຕາມທ່າອຽງການຜະລິດ 
ແລະ ການຄ້າ.  ຍັງຂາດຂໍ້ມູນ
ກ່ຽວກັບບໍລິມາດການຜະລິດ
ເຂົ້າພາຍໃນປະເທດ, ການເກັບ
ມ້ຽນເຂົ້າ, ການຄ້າ
ເຂົ້າທີ່ເປັນທາງການ ແລະ 
ບໍ່ເປັນທາງການ ແລະ ລາຄາ
ເຂົ້າ.  ຍິ່ງໄປກວ່າ
ນັ້ັນການຕັດສິນນະໂຍບາຍ
ກ່າວກັບລາຄາເຂົ້າໃນລະດັບ
ປະເທດແມ່ນຂຶ້ນກັບສະພາບ 
ແລະ ການເໜັງຕິງຂອງຕະຫລາດ
ລາຄາເຂົ້າໜຽວໃນລະດັບພາກ
ພື້ນ.  ດັ່ງນັ້ນຂໍ້ມູນ
ກ່ຽວກັບການຄ້າຂາຍເຂົ້າ
ຂ້າມຊາຍແດນລະຫວ່າງບັນດາ
ປະເທດໃນພາກພື້ນ ແລະ ຄຸນ
ລັກສະນະຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າໜຽວ
ໃນຕະຫລາດຈິ່ງເປັນບາດກ້າວ
ທຳອິດທີ່ສຳຄັນໃນນະໂຍບາຍ
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ພາຍໃນປະເທດ ແລະ ສຳລັບ
ການວາງແຜນການລົງທຶນ. 
 
 ບໍ່ໃຊ້ມາດຕະການໄລຍະສັນ
ເຂົາໃນການເຂົ້າແຊກແຊງແກ້
ໄຂບັນຫາລາເຂົ້າໃນຕະຫລາດ.  
ເຫດຜົນຕົ້ນຕໍ່ກໍ່ຄື
ວ່າບັນດາຄົວເຮືອນຕ່າງ ໆ 
ຢູ່ໃນລາວໄດ້ຮັບຜົນປະໂຫຍ
ດແບບສະເລ່ັຍກັນໄປຈາກລາຄາ
ເຂົາທີ່ສູງຂຶ້ນ ເຖິງ
ແມ່ນວ່າມີບາງກຸ່ມ
ປະຊາກອນຈຳນວນໜື່ງໃນເຂດ
ຕົວເມືອງ ແລະ ເຂດຂາດແຄນ
ເຂົ້າຈະບໍ່ໄດ້ຮັບຜົນປະ
ໂຫຍດກໍ່ຕາມ.  ສຳລັບ
ປະຊາຊົນຜູ້ທີ່ໄດ້ຮັບ
ຜົນກະທົບໃນທາງບໍ່ດີທີ່
ເກີດມາຈາກລາຄາເຂົ້າທີ່
ສູງຂຶ້ນລັດຖະບານອາດ
ພິຈາລະນາຂະຫຍາຍແຜນງານ
ຕາໜ່າງຄວາມປອດໄພທາງ
ສັງຄົມ, ເປັນຕົ້ນແມ່ນ
ແຜນງານອາຫານເພື່ອງານ, 
ຊື່ງເປັນການເຂົ້າແຊກແຊງ
ແກ້ໄຂບັນຫາທີ່ມີ
ປະສິດທິຜົນອັນໜຶ່ງ. 
 
 ປຸກຈິດສຳນຶກໃຫ້ຮູ້ຜົນ
ເນື່ອງຕໍ່ລະບົບເສດຖະກິດ
ມະຫາພາກໃນໄຍຍະຍາວ.  ຍັງມີ
ຄວາມຈຳເປັນທີ່ຈະຕ້ອງ
ເພີ່ມຄວາມເຂົ້າໃຈກ່ຽວ
ກັບວ່າລາຄາຂອງອາຫານ ແລະ 
ພະລັງງານໃນໂລກມີຜົນກະທົບ
ຕໍ່ລາຄາສິນຄ້າຢູ່ໃນລາວ 
ແລະ ຢູ່ໃນພາກພື້ນຄືແນວ
ໃດ.  ລາຄາສິນຄາບໍລິໂພກທີ່
ມີການປ່ຽນແປງໃນປະເທດໄທ 
ແລະ ຫວຽດນາມອາດສົ່ງຜົນ
ກະທົບທີ່ສຳຄັນຕໍ່ລາຄາ
ສິນຄາຢູ່ໃນລາວ.  ບັນດາ
ມາດຕະການທາງດ້ານນະໂຍບາຍ
ຄວນຄຳນຶງວ່າການເພີ່ມ
ຂຶ້ນຂອງລາຄາອາຫານ ແລະ 
ເຂົ້າມີຜົນກະທົບຕໍ່
ເນື່ອງໂດຍກົງໃສ່ຄ່າແຮງ
ງານຢູ່ພາຍໃນປະເທດ.  ການຄາດ
ຄະເນຕ່າງ ໆ ລ່ວງໜ້າກໍ່
ອາດເກີດຄວາມກົດດັນໃຫ້
ລາຄາເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນໄປຕາມການ
ເວລາໃນອະນາຄົດເຊັ່ນກັນ.  
ຍິ່ງໄປກວ່ານັ້ນລາຄາເຂົ້າ
ທີ່ສູງໃນປະຈຸບັນໄດ້ເກີດ
ຂຶ້ນຍ້ອນການເພີ່ມຂຶ້ນ
ຂອງການປ່ອຍສິນເຊື້ອຂອງ
ພາກສ່ວນເອກະຊົນຊຶ່ງຢູ່
ໃນຕົວຂອງມັນກໍ່ພາໃຫ້ມີ
ຄວາມກົດດັນທີ່ຈະພາໃຫ້
ລາຄາສູງຂຶ້ນ.  ສິ່ງທັງ
ໝົດເຫລົ່ານີ້ສະແດງໃຫ້
ເຫັນວ່າມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນທີ່
ຈະຕ້ອງມີການຕິດຕາມຢ່າງ
ຄົບຖ້ວນກ່ຽວກັບທ່າອຽງ
ຂອງລາຄາເຂົ້າຢູ່ໃນລາວ. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The objective of this policy brief is to 
identify likely factors driving the recent 
rice price hike and suggest options to 
manage rice price volatility in the future. 
In mid-2010, glutinous rice prices in Laos 
increased by more than 50 percent. In 
fact, the 2010 price hike was faster than 
during the 2006 to 2008 global food 
crisis. Although rice prices have subdued 
in first half of 2011, they remain 
historically high. This policy note aims to 
identify factors behind the recent rice 
price hikes and make initial policy 
recommendations.  
Rice is of utmost importance for Laos.        
As the main staple food, glutinous rice 
has also major cultural and political 
significance. It is estimated that people in 
Laos consume up to 200 kilograms per 
capita of milled rice per annum, 
constituting some 70 percent of their 
calorie and protein intake.3  
Rice production in Laos is subsistence 
oriented. Only some 10 percent of 
production capacity is actually marketed. 
Cultivation covers more than 80 percent 
of the total cropped area. Geographically, 
rice is grown in all regions of the country, 
but the overwhelming part of rice 
production is from lowland fields, which 
are in close proximity to the Thai border. 
Most production is glutinous rice, 
distributed along three main ecosystems: 
low-land rain-fed rice, upland rice, and 
irrigated dry season rice. 
 Achieving self-sufficiency in rice at 
the national level has been a top priority 
for the Government. In spite of the 
improvements in rice production and 
yields, not all rural households are able to 
fully meet their rice consumption 
requirements. Because of its small market 
                                                 
3 In addition, the use of glutinous rice for various 
rice-flour noodles and sweets is extensive. 
surpluses, Laos is vulnerable to price 
fluctuations stemming from domestic 
supply shocks and regional trade 
developments.  
Traditional supply and demand 
factors explain only a small part of the 
2010 glutinous rice price inflation.  We 
find that domestic rice supply shortfalls 
might explain only a small part of recent 
rice price inflation, albeit there is some 
uncertainty about the information about 
aggregate production volumes and its 
location. We show that both seasonality 
trends and decline in marketable 
surpluses in 2010 wet season due to dry 
spell do not explain sufficiently well the 
rice price inflation. The analysis also 
rules out increased credit supply and 
hoarding by millers.  
Regional trade is likely the main 
proximate cause for high glutinous rice 
prices. The analysis shows that regional 
trade triggers price increases, which in 
turn may have been exaggerated by 
domestic price and trade policy 
responses.  
Trade with Viet Nam was likely the 
main reason for short term price 
fluctuations, while trade with Thailand 
affects medium and long term price 
trends. Large official rice exports to 
Vietnam preceded the price jumps both in 
2006 and 2010. The analysis shows that 
rice inflation has been highest in areas 
that trade with Vietnam and Thailand. 
However, price transmission into the Lao 
glutinous rice market has been 
asymmetric, as rice price increases from 
neighboring countries are transmitted 
more rapidly than price decreases. 
Specific findings of this policy brief 
include:  
 
 There is a natural demand for Lao 
rice in Vietnam. This is because of 
favorable geography, harvest patterns, 
and a large demand for glutinous rice 
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for special occasions. The fact that 
periods of large rice price hikes 
coincide with large official exports to 
Viet Nam is also attributed to national 
and provincial trade policy decisions, 
which appear to reinforce price 
volatility.  
 
 Trade with Thailand is important due 
to similar dietary preferences for 
glutinous rice as main staple food, 
although information about actual 
trade flows is unreliable. Lao paddy is 
typically cheaper than Thai paddy at 
farm gate level, while the Lao milled 
glutinous rice is more expensive than 
the Thai equivalent due to high 
milling costs. Thus, there is thus a 
strong incentive to export paddy.  
 
A detailed analysis of the effect of 
trade on rice prices in Laos, however, is 
limited by the paucity of information of 
regional supply dynamics.  There is a 
possibility that major supply shocks may 
be regional, which could affect Laos, 
Thailand, and Vietnam simultaneously. 
Hence, future analysis should thus look at 
regional glutinous rice production trends 
and related trade flows, to estimate the 
extent they effectively can explain Lao 
price volatility. This is because trade may 
be the likely proximate cause of Lao price 
spikes, as indicated by the findings of this 
document, but volatility in Thai and 
Vietnamese production—and other factors 
explaining prices in neighboring 
countries—may be the original cause. 
The current Government policy 
responses to high rice prices have 
included (i) export restrictions, (ii) 
stockpiling, and (iii) plans to implement 
temporary price controls. However, the 
effectiveness of these policy measures has 
been mixed.  First, Laos’ rice exports are 
typically restricted by the use of export 
quotas and taxes. There may be a conflict 
between national trade policy and the 
rights of provinces to issue export quotas. 
Second, government intervention to 
stabilize rice prices in the form of 
stockpiling is partly unpopular, owing to 
likely limited benefits for millers. Third, 
price controls can induce negative 
consequences for long-run rice sector 
development. International experience 
suggests that such interventions often fail 
to their stated goals. In fact, there is a risk 
that they may cause more uncertainty for 
producers and processors which could 
limit investments, production and trade 
incentives.  
There is a need to closely coordinate 
rice production and trade policies—at the 
national and provincial levels—in order 
to effectively manage price volatility. This 
would require good knowledge and 
information systems, which in turn would 
provide basis for evidence-based policy 
decisions. The proposed actions could 
include: 
 
 Develop a rice sector strategy and 
policy framework. This would provide 
the basis for coordination and 
planning of public and private 
investments for enhanced rice 
production. Increasing production and 
marketable surplus is necessary 
condition for future price stability.4 
With the Lao population growing at 
2.2 percent per year, the demand for 
rice is expected to grow substantially 
over time, requiring continued yield 
and production increases. Current 
high rice price levels, which are 
expected to stay, are an opportunity 
for rice sector development in Laos. 
The development of a comprehensive 
strategy and policy framework will 
                                                 
4 Government estimates suggest that rice 
production should increase from currently 3 
million tons to 4.2 million tons by 2015. 
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help to coordinate production, 
milling, and trade policy decisions. It 
will be also important to coordinate 
policy decisions at the national, 
provincial and district levels, and 
address knowledge gaps.  
 
 Establish an effective rice price 
monitoring system. This should track 
simultaneously domestic and regional 
price, production and trade trends. 
There is paucity of information about 
the domestic production volumes, 
stocks in storage, formal and informal 
trade, and prices. Furthermore, 
effective national rice policy 
decisions in Laos depend also on 
dynamics and behavior of regional 
glutinous rice markets. Estimates of 
actual cross-border trade flows 
between countries and characteristics 
of the regional glutinous rice markets 
would be thus a useful first step in 
domestic policy and investment 
planning processes.  
 
 Restrain from intervening into rice 
markets through short-term measures. 
The main reason for this is that 
households in Laos gain on average 
from higher rice prices, albeit, some 
of the population in urban and food 
deficit areas will lose. For those, who 
will be negatively affected by high 
rice prices, the Government may want 
to consider expanding social safety 
nets programs in Laos, such as food 
for work programs, as an effective 
intervention. 
 
 Be aware of long-run macroeconomic 
implications. There is a need to better 
understand how world food and 
energy prices affect price trends in 
Laos and in the region. Consumer 
price developments in Thailand and 
Vietnam can have significant impact 
on prices in Laos through price 
transmission. Policy measures also 
need to consider that rice and food 
price increases eventually feed into 
domestic wages. And expectations 
can create inflationary pressures over 
time. Moreover, current price 
inflation is taking place in the context 
of already high private credit growth, 
which itself can contribute to 
inflationary pressures. All this 
justifies comprehensive monitoring of 
food price trends in Laos.  
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1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 
Rice is of special political and economic 
importance for Laos. It is the main staple 
crop and among the most important 
factors determining the welfare status of 
approximately 6.4 million people in Laos. 
Rice cultivation covers more than 80 
percent of the total cropped area and it is 
grown in all regions of the country. The 
Central and Southern regions, in 
proximity to the Thai border, account for 
some 90 percent of the total rice 
production. During the last decade, Laos 
has experienced a steady increase in GDP 
and several improvements in the general 
standard of living. These achievements 
are attributed to multiple factors, 
including improved policies, which have 
resulted in high growth in services, 
hydro-energy, and mining, but in 
particular to agriculture and rice 
production. 
During 2010, glutinous (sticky) rice 
prices increased by more than 50 percent. 
Glutinous price inflation, measured 
throughout this report as year-to-year 
growth rates, was in fact higher in 2010 
than during the peak of the global food 
crisis in 2008. And even if prices have 
declined recently, glutinous rice inflation 
was still over 30 percent in February. Yet, 
despite its great importance, and concerns 
regarding price stability and social 
welfare impacts, there is little 
understanding of what drives the current 
price inflation. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that it is not just a change in 
seasonality, and because of its magnitude, 
inflation cannot be explained entirely by 
traditional domestic supply and demand 
factors. The rice-price puzzle is made 
more complex by the fact that Laos 
produces mainly glutinous rice, largely 
for domestic consumption. Some 
observers believe that only a small 
international market exists for it. Hence, 
despite the fact that high prices coincide 
with currently high world food prices, it 
is sometimes believed that international 
food price transmission only play a 
limited role.5 
The objective of this policy note is to 
identify likely factors driving rice prices 
and suggest options to manage rice price 
volatility in the future. It also provides a 
snapshot of recent developments in the 
rice sector, and describes rice and food 
price trends and their implications. Based 
on these findings, the note discusses 
policy options. The policy brief has six 
chapters, including this introduction. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief outline of the 
rice sector. Chapter 3 describes recent 
trends in world and Lao food prices. It 
also provides insights into likely 
macroeconomic and household welfare 
impacts of rice price inflation. Chapter 4 
discusses the potential causes of rice price 
inflation, as suggested by other reports 
and people interviewed. Chapter 5 
analyzes the role of the regional rice 
market in determining prices, which this 
policy brief identifies as the primary 
cause of the glutinous rice price hike. 
Chapter 6 concludes by presenting 
recommendations. 
2. THE RICE SECTOR IN LAOS 
This chapter provides an overview of the 
Lao rice sector. The sector has grown 
significantly over the past decade. Most 
likely this was due to the successful 
introduction and adoption of improved 
seed varieties. Glutinous rice is the 
dominant variety of rice, accounting for 
about 85 percent of total rice output. 
Production is mainly rain-fed and 
concentrated in the Central and Southern 
                                                 
5 This policy brief, using rice price data over the 
past decade, will shed light on these assumptions. 
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Figure 1: Rice production increased and is dominated by lowland rain-fed paddy 
Paddy production in millions tons, 2000-2010 
 
Composition of paddy production by ecosystem in million tons, 2009 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; and staff compilations. 
 
These graphs show paddy production from 2000-2010 as well as the composition of production in 2009. Paddy 
production in 2010 is an estimate and shows a discrepancy between government forecasts and FAO/WFP field 
assessments, indicated in the stacked zone. 
 
regions, mostly in proximity to the Thai 
border. However, measuring production 
remains a challenge and much of the data 
on rice production is uncertain.6 
Rice production increased  
As the main staple food, rice has a major 
cultural and political significance. Access 
to rice is the single most important factor 
determining the welfare status in rural 
and semi-urban areas. People in Laos now 
                                                 
6 As discussed in Chapter 4, the measurement 
issues make an assessment of supply factors 
driving rice glutinous inflation challenging. 
consume up to 200 kilograms per capita 
of milled rice per annum, which 
constitutes almost 70 percent of their 
calorie and protein intake (EMC, 2011; 
FAO/MAF, 2009; ADB, 2006). Per capita 
rice consumption is thought to be among 
the highest in the world. Rice production, 
in levels, continued to rise. In particular, 
rain-fed rice production increased by 6 
percent to 2.5 million tons in 2009 
relative to the previous year. Meanwhile, 
irrigated rice yield rose by around 2 
percent to about half a million tons.  
However, rice productivity, as measured 
by total rice area, remained almost 
constant. Total rain-fed rice area 
increased marginally to 3.8 tons per 
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Map 1: Income from rice production is concentrated in the Central and Southern 
regions 
 
 
Source: LECS4 and staff estimates. 
 
The map shows rice cultivation as the main source of village income in 2008. Dark areas indicate relative concentration of 
rice income. Visible from the map is that rice cultivation is in relative proximity to the Thai border. 
hectare in 2009 from 3.7 tons per hectare 
in 2008 while total irrigated rice area was 
unchanged at 4.7 tons per hectare.  
Achieving self-sufficiency in rice at the 
national level has been a top priority. It 
was achieved in 1999/2000. Over the past 
decade, growth in the rice sector has 
allowed farmers to increasingly switch 
from buffaloes to mono-axle tractors for 
land preparation. Today, about 70 percent 
of glutinous rice seeds come from the 
improved varieties compared to just 5 
percent in the 1990s. As Lao farmers do 
not use much fertilizer or pesticides 
(FAO/MAF, 2009) this shift is thought to 
have played a significant role in 
productivity improvements (EMC, 2011).  
Official data report steady 
production, and yield increases over the 
past decade. As shown in Figure 1, total 
paddy rice production has grown from 
some 2 million tons in 2000 to more than 
3 million tons in 2010. During this period 
rice productivity increased from about 3 
to 3.5 tons per hectare. Altogether, the 
production trends clearly suggest 
significant improvements in rice 
production and productivity over the past 
decade. At the same time, official data are 
reported to suffer from shortcomings. For 
example, separate statistics for glutinous 
and non-glutinous paddy rice production 
are not collected (Schiller and others, 
2006), and expert estimates report lower 
average yields than the official ones 
(EMC, 2011). Moreover, paddy 
production data are generated by first 
estimating planted areas in the districts, 
then using approximate district rice yields 
to derive district production. Production 
statistics at the provincial level are then 
calculated by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry. Each stage can be subject to 
shortcomings and political bias (Bourdet, 
2000). Finally, there are discrepancies 
between official paddy production and the 
actual rice consumption patterns observed 
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from household surveys (FAO/MAF, 
2009).  
Consequently, there is uncertainty 
regarding current levels of national and 
provincial rice production. For example, 
field assessments indicate that aggregate 
rice production in 2010 may have 
decreased by 6 percent compared to 2009. 
Both paddy area and yields are estimated 
to be lower (FAO/WFP, 2011). These 
numbers differ substantially from 
government forecasts, though final data 
are yet to be released. However, to 
anticipate some of the discussion in the 
following chapters, it is unreasonable to 
associate the possible decline in 
production with the observed 50 percent 
peak in glutinous rice price inflation in 
mid-2010. This is because of the 
agricultural production cycle. Rain-fed 
lowland paddy is typically planted from 
May to June, with the start of the rainy 
season, transplanted in July, and 
harvested from October to November 
(Schiller and others, 2006). And rain-fed 
lowland paddy production represents 80 
percent of annual output. The relevant 
rice supply indicator for the 2010 rice 
price hikes is thus the 2009 crop season. 
Expectations about the 2010 crop might 
have contributed to inflation, but this 
seems unlikely, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Production is rain-fed, concentrated in 
the Central and Southern regions, and 
in proximity to Thai border 
 
Rice cultivation covers more than 80 
percent of the total cropped area, but is 
unevenly distributed over provinces. It is 
estimated that some 90 percent of total 
rice production is in the lowland fields, 
concentrated in the Central and Southern 
provinces. Map 1 shows spatial patterns 
of rice production in 2008. The Central 
region accounts for more than half of the 
total rice area and production output. 
Savannakhet province has the largest rice 
area of all provinces. It accounts for over 
20 percent of national production. 
Vientiane and Khammuane also have 
large rice areas in the region. The 
remaining rice area is located in the 
Northern and Southern regions, which 
account for less than half of total 
production. Champasack and Saravane 
are the two major rice-producing 
provinces in the south. The north is 
characterized by mountainous terrain and 
contributes to some 20 percent of total 
paddy production. Of the three regions, 
the Northern region has the lowest yields. 
Rice production here is often based on 
slash-and-burn cultivation, despite 
government efforts to reduce this practice 
(ADB, 2006). 
Production is distributed along three 
main ecosystems: lowland rain-fed rice, 
upland rice, and irrigated dry season 
rice. It is often claimed that 90 percent of 
the rice area is rain-fed, with the 
remaining being irrigated (EMC, 2011). 
But other estimates suggest that irrigation 
may in fact be more significant, reaching 
up to 25 percent of the total paddy area 
(FAO/MAF, 2009). Particularly in the 
lowlands, rain-fed rice dominates. Most 
of the rice production is subsistence-
oriented; smallholders have an average 
farm size of less than 2 hectares. 
Although rice production is the single 
most important economic activity, 
accounting for about one third of the 
agricultural GDP, little rice is marketed. 
Estimates suggest that roughly 10 percent 
of the more than 3 million ton production 
capacity is actually marketed (Bourdet, 
2000; ETC, 2011; Hill and Christiaensen, 
2006). Other data suggests that the share 
of marketed production is higher, and 
may reach about a third for non-glutinous 
paddy and 14 percent for glutinous paddy 
(FAO/MAF, 2009).  
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Although Laos claims to be self-
sufficient in rice production, food security 
is still a challenge. Population growth is 
one of the main determinants of rice 
consumption over time (Bourdet, 2000). 
With the population growing at 2.2 
percent per year, the demand for rice is 
expected to grow substantially, requiring 
yield increases. Moreover, despite the 
overall good performance of the rice 
sector, not all households are able to 
permanently meet their rice consumption 
requirements. About one third of the 
population has food deficits for several 
months. And half of the children in rural 
areas are reported to suffer from chronic 
malnutrition. Laos’ economic growth 
experienced over the past decade thus 
may not have been inclusive enough to 
result in an improved nutritional status of 
the rural population (WFP, 2007).7  
Mixed evidence on market integration  
 
Because of its small market size, 
temporary trade restrictions, and shallow 
annual surpluses, Laos is exposed to 
large price fluctuations. This can stem 
from domestic supply shocks and regional 
developments. The total size of the Lao 
rice market is less than 10 percent of the 
market size of Thailand. Some observers 
argue that due to subsistence production 
and regional price disparities, overall 
market integration maybe limited 
(Bourdet, 2000; van der Weide, 2006), 
even though market integration in general 
may have improved over time, possibly 
due to investments in transport 
infrastructure and market institutions 
(Andersson and others, 2007; Takamatsu, 
                                                 
7 Another interpretation is that this may be an 
indication of glutinous rice trade, as main 
production areas are located across the Thai 
border. 
2002). But the importance of rice trade 
within Laos and to neighboring countries 
is sparsely documented and hence 
constitutes a knowledge gap. It is also 
possible that market integration may have 
improved over time due to infrastructure 
investments. In fact, some studies observe 
temporary rice trade flows to Vietnam, 
Thailand, and possibly China (Segue and 
others, 2009; GSD, 2005). Paddy trade is 
also encouraged by the underdeveloped 
milling sector. Most of the rice mills are 
small family-run operations often 
delivering a poor-quality product. It is not 
unusual therefore for farmers and 
merchants to take paddy across the Thai 
border to more efficient mills that are 
capable of turning out a high-quality 
product, which then is eventually 
imported back to Laos. In addition, 
milling around the Mekong River in Laos 
is done by a relatively large number of 
commercial mills. Rice traders often own 
these private mills. Altogether, there are 
conflicting findings regarding the actual 
size of cross-border trade. The evidence 
on national and regional market 
integration is inconclusive. 
3. RECENT FOOD AND RICE 
PRICE TRENDS 
This chapter looks at trends in world and 
Lao prices and its implications. It 
describes the evolution of world and Lao 
food and rice prices. The focus is on 
glutinous and non-glutinous rice. The 
chapter shows that there has been a small 
impact of world food prices in Laos. The 
behavior of glutinous and non-glutinous 
rice is substantially different. Glutinous 
rice dominates food price inflation and in 
the medium run may contribute to trigger 
overall price inflation. While the 
macroeconomic impact has been small, 
price developments need close 
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Figure 2: World food prices are high but rice did not increase as much as in 2008 
 
 
Source: World Bank DECPG. 
 
The graph shows the evolution of world food prices (left) and Thai rice price (right) from January 2000 to March 2011. 
Visible are the world food price peaks in 2008 and 2011. Thai rice prices increased enormously in 2008, but since then 
appear more stable. 
monitoring. Analysis undertaken for this 
policy brief suggests that the majority of 
the farmers have marginally benefitted 
from glutinous rice price increases. But 
high prices have had adverse effects on 
the welfare of urban and food-deficient 
population groups. 
World food price changes are less 
pronounced for rice than other food 
items 
Rapidly rising world food prices coincide 
with rice inflation in Laos.  It is hence 
important to understand recent trends. 
Figure 2 shows the World Bank’s food 
price index for January 2000 to March 
2011.8  The index increased by over 30 
                                                 
8 The World Bank’s food index comprises major 
agricultural commodities with large shares in 
international trade, and those shares determine the 
weight of each commodity in the index. Food 
items generally have an international reference 
price. Trends are very similar with the food price 
indices from FAO or the IMF. 
percent from January 2010 to March 
2011, now being close to its peak in June 
2008. The index is constructed from 
several components, and all major ones 
have risen sharply, but among individual 
commodities, sugar, edible oil prices and 
staple crops have risen most rapidly. 
Importantly, rice prices have been rather 
stable, which is a key difference from the 
2006-2008 food crisis. Some observers 
argue that rice price increases in 2006-
2008 were triggered by export bans in 
major Asian rice producing countries. As 
described in Box 1, these harmful policy 
responses have not occurred during the 
2010-2011 food crisis, which partly helps 
in explaining stable international rice 
prices. 
Importantly, rice prices in Vietnam 
and Thailand, Laos’ giant rice producing 
neighbors, are stable. Global rice prices 
in March 2011 were unchanged relative 
to a year earlier, and on the whole, the 
benchmark price is roughly 32 percent 
below the peak attained during the 2008 
crisis. Good harvests in the key exporting 
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Box 1: Rice and trade in the 2006-2008 and current food crisis 
Despite some parallels, the current food price rise differs in important ways from the 2006 to 2008 
crisis. The rise has been led by sugar, cooking oils, and a few staple crops such as wheat. A 
crucial difference is that good harvests have kept the international price of rice relatively stable. 
Moreover, the domestic prices of staple foods in many developing economies have fallen, in 
contrast to the increases seen in 2006 to 2008. Robust rice harvests in Asia and strong harvests 
in Africa thus account for much of the more limited international rise and lower domestic prices 
(Shimelse and Eidelman, 2011).  
 
The 2010-2011 food crisis also offers an important trade policy lessons. Major rice producing 
countries did not issue export bans. These may have accounted for some 45 percent of the rice 
price increases in 2008 (Martin and Anderson, 2011). Measures to secure access to domestic 
food Supplies had a snowball effect, as other governments also took preemptive measures, 
contributing to a further surge in world rice prices that no government would have wished for 
(Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen, 2008). While more than 20 countries imposed export restrictions 
in 2008, only a few did in 2010. 
 
countries Thailand and Vietnam, and 
global stocks at the highest level since 
2002 have generally put to rest anxieties 
about upward pressures on the export 
price of rice. Production uncertainties had 
initially contributed to an 18 percent price 
increase between June and December 
2010 and led to large imports to 
complement domestic stocks. As a result, 
domestic rice prices have moderated 
recently (World Bank, 2011). 
The single most important factor 
underpinning  world food price surges 
are weather-related supply shocks. 
Production shortfalls in wheat, barley and 
other grains have occurred notably in 
Russia and the Ukraine since June 2010. 
Additionally, Russia and the Ukraine 
imposed a wheat export ban in August. 
The European Union, Canada and the 
United States have also experienced 
disappointing yields. These factors, have 
outweighed favorable production 
outcomes in Argentina and Australia, and 
induced large draw-downs in food stocks, 
thereby tightening global supply. Another 
leading factor has been the weakening of 
the US dollar since mid-September, 
which continues to sustain the prices of 
nearly all agricultural and non-
agricultural commodities. On the demand 
side, strong economic growth in emerging 
economies during 2010 has also 
contributed to the rise in commodity food 
prices. 
Food price increases are also linked 
to energy price increases. Crude oil 
prices surged by 10.3 percent in March 
2011, and were 36 percent higher than a 
year earlier. These oil price increases 
impact on food prices. Estimates suggest 
that a 10 percent increase in crude oil 
prices may be associated with a 2.7 
percent increase in the World Bank food 
price index (Baffes, 2011). Multiple 
transmission channels are at play. First, 
higher crude oil prices encourage greater 
use of food products such as corn, 
vegetable oil, and sugar in the production 
of biofuels in developed and emerging 
economies. Second, higher energy prices 
feed into the cost of food production 
through higher fertilizer prices, the cost of 
irrigation, and other farm inputs. The 
extent of energy price impact varies 
significantly depending on the type of 
crop and level of mechanization. A third 
channel of energy price impact is through 
the increases in the costs of crop 
transportation to destination markets, 
leading to larger price variations 
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Figure 3: World food prices slowly transmit into Lao food prices 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau. 
 
The graph shows the evolution of the Lao consumer and food price indices from January 2000 to December 2010. The 
base of the index is December 2005. Visible is that in 2006 both indices start to drift apart. 
 
domestically and higher costs for 
importing countries (World Bank, 2011). 
Small impact of international food 
crises on Lao prices 
The 2006-2008 global food crisis had a 
small short-run impact.  One view is that 
Laos by and large escaped the global food 
crisis in 2006-2008 because of its limited 
exposure to international trade in food 
and national self-sufficiency in rice 
(World Bank, 2009). A vast majority of 
the poor live in rural areas and produce 
enough rice for own consumption. The 
macroeconomic impact was also small. 
Annual consumer price inflation rate 
increased to only 10 percent in mid-2008, 
while inflation of food consumer prices 
peaked at 14 percent in August 2008, 
much lower than in many other 
developing countries. 
Over the medium run, world food 
price changes are transmitted slowly to 
domestic prices. In Laos, food prices have 
risen faster than non-food prices since 
2006. Thus, in spite of the small impact 
of the world food crisis there is a 
relationship with the evolution of 
domestic prices. Figure 3 shows the 
consumer price indexes and food prices 
from January 2000 to December 2010. 
The food share in the consumer price 
index is 40.9 percent. The two series start 
to deviate in 2006, when food prices rise 
quickly, reaching a peak in mid-2008. 
Both series decline in late 2008, and then 
start to rise slowly. In mid-2010, food 
prices begin rising, while non-food prices 
remain stable. As a result, between 
January 2006 and December 2010, food 
prices rose by 42.6 percent while non-
food prices rose by only 13.4 percent. 
This is a difference of close to 30 
percentage points. Hence, there is a 
structural change in the relationship 
between food and non-food prices around 
2006, and it seems to be related to world 
market prices, which also started to 
increase in 2006. At the same time, the 
link between the world food price index 
and Lao food price index is sluggish and 
not very tight.  
Changes in Lao food prices are 
almost entirely dominated by glutinous 
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rice prices. Rice is the main stable crop 
and consequently an important food item  
in the consumer price index, with a 
weight of 7.3 percent in the basket. One 
way of highlighting the importance of 
food and rice prices is to decompose 
annual changes in the overall consumer 
and food price indices. Figure 4 shows 
that inflation in 2010, and in the previous 
years, is mainly the result of food price 
increases, which explain some 70 percent 
of overall inflation. Food prices, in turn, 
are influenced by glutinous rice price 
increases, in particular during 2006 to 
2007 and in 2010. The contribution of 
rice price inflation is much larger than its 
weight because of the enormous glutinous 
rice price increases. Ordinary (non-
glutinous) rice prices play almost no role 
in explaining overall food inflation. Not 
Figure 4: Glutinous rice prices drive food prices and overall inflation  
Decomposition of consumer price inflation 
 
 
Decomposition of food price inflation 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau and staff calculations. 
 
The graphs show a decomposition of the monthly food and consumer price indices from January 2005 to December 2010 
using CPI weights and individual growth rates. Visible is that overall inflation is below 10 percent and almost entirely 
driven by food prices. Food price inflation itself is determined in 2006-2007 and 2010 by glutinous rice inflation. Ordinary 
rice has a barely visible impact in 2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 5: Thai export prices differ for glutinous and ordinary rice 
 
Source: Thai Rice Exporters Association. 
 
The graph shows the evolution of the Thai glutinous and ordinary rice from January 2000 to February 2011 measured in 
US$ per ton. Visible is the spread of both series in particular in 2006 and 2009. 
 
visible in the graphs are other, indirect 
effects. For example, it is likely that the 
jump in rice prices also has a strong effect 
on other food and non-food prices, partly 
because rice is an input in the production 
of many other goods, such as beer and 
restaurant meals, and partly because 
higher rice prices create a demand for 
higher wages. In fact, the Lao Federation 
of Trade Unions, the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare and National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
agreed in principle to increase the 
minimum wage because of high food 
prices (Lao Voices, January 18, 2011). 
 
Glutinous rice changes differs 
substantially from ordinary rice  
The evolution of world market prices for 
glutinous and non-glutinous rice differs 
substantially. This difference probably 
explains the weak short-run relationship 
between world and Lao food inflation. 
Glutinous rice trade has a small share in 
the world market. It is estimated at less 
than 10 percent, and thus not well-
covered by the world food index. But for 
consumption and inflation in Laos it 
matters more than non-glutinous rice. 
About 85 percent of the rice produced is 
glutinous, and its weight in the consumer 
price index is 6.2 percent compared to 1.1 
percent for non-glutinous rice.9 The price 
of glutinous rice is thus a key factor for 
food inflation in Laos. Figure 5 depicts 
US$ prices of Thai exports of glutinous 
(10 percent broken) and non-glutinous (5 
percent broken) from January 2000 to 
February 2011. The prices represent the 
world market price of rice, since Thailand 
is the largest rice exporter in the world. 
The prices have evolved very differently, 
particularly after 2005. Glutinous rice 
prices increase sharply during 2006, 
presumably in line with other world 
market food prices, while non-glutinous 
rice prices are stable until early 2008, 
when they shoot up. Both prices start 
declining after May 2008, but while the 
                                                 
9 The National Statistical Bureau is in the process 
of revising the weighting scheme based on 
LECS4. The food and rice shares will likely be 
slightly larger.  
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Figure 6: Lao glutinous rice inflation in real terms reaches  
a decade-high in mid-2010 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau. 
 
The graph shows real annualized monthly glutinous rice inflation from January 2001 to December 2010. The rice prices 
are based on real consumer price index data (January 2010=100). The overall high volatility and the peaks during the 
2006-2008 food crisis and recently, in 2010, are evident in the graph. 
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non-glutinous rice price drops from US$ 
907 in May 2008 to US$ 529 in February 
2011, the glutinous rice price starts rising 
in 2009, and thus increases from US$ 783 
to US$ 983 over the same period.10  
Glutinous and non-glutinous rice are not 
close substitutes. In the two countries 
where glutinous rice is consumed as a 
major staple food, Laos and Thailand, 
demand is probably highly price inelastic 
since non-glutinous rice is generally not 
viewed as a substitute by most people. In 
other Asian countries, such as for 
example Vietnam, where typically minor 
quantities are consumed, glutinous rice is 
used for preparing breakfast meals and 
sweet dishes for special occasions, 
making substitution impossible. Hence, 
demand for glutinous rice does not 
respond much to rice price differences. 
The two types of rice are nevertheless 
substitutes in production, as farmers can 
                                                 
10 Price series in this report are mostly presented 
in nominal terms for transparency. Deflating the 
series (for example by consumer prices) shows the 
same visual impressions for rice price trends in 
real and nominal terms. The reason is that, over 
the past few years, overall inflation in Thailand 
and Laos has been low. 
switch between them. However, this 
mechanism does not seem to have had an 
impact on prices during recent years.  
Lao glutinous rice prices are volatile. 
Figure 6 shows annual percentage 
changes in prices of glutinous rice for 
2000 to 2010. Prices rose by over 50 
percent between late 2009 and late 2010, 
and even though they started to decline 
due to supply increases in the (main) 
harvest period (October-November), 
annual inflation was over 40 percent in 
December 2010. It is noteworthy that 
glutinous rice inflation was never over 30 
percent during the 2006-2008-food crisis. 
Overall, glutinous rice prices must be 
considered highly volatile, since over the 
past decade annual inflation rates varied 
between minus 15 and up to 50 percent.11 
Non-glutinous rice prices only 
increased moderately during 2010. 
Annual inflation rates for Lao and 
imported Thai non-glutinous rice, sold in 
                                                 
11 Moreover, extending the series back includes 
short episodes with rice inflation rates of over 100 
percent in 1998. This is associated with the 1997 
Asian financial crisis and subsequent 
macroeconomic turmoil in Laos. 
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Figure 7: Lao and Thai ordinary rice prices only increased moderately 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau. 
 
The graph shows annual (year-to-year) growth rates of monthly ordinary rice inflation. The rice prices based on consumer 
price index data. Visible is overall high volatility peaking in 2006 and particularly in 2010. 
Laos, are depicted by Figure 7. The figure 
highlights three interesting facts. First, 
non-glutinous rice inflation rates barely 
exceeded 10 percent during 2010. 
Second, Lao and Thai non-glutinous rice 
are close substitutes, their prices move 
together quite closely. Third, the rice-
price shock in 2008 was to some extent 
transmitted to Laos, as non-glutinous rice 
inflation increased to over 40 percent. 
However, world market prices rose by 
over 60 percent, but then declined 
rapidly. In Laos both the increase and the 
decrease were clearly smaller. As a result, 
from January 2008 to January 2010 prices 
increased by 46 percent in Laos, while the 
world market price (Thai export price) 
decreased by 9 percent.  
The swings in annual inflation rates 
last for several years. This suggests that 
the volatility is not due to seasonal 
factors. Figure 8 shows monthly inflation 
rates from January 2000 to December 
2010. The volatility observed in the 
annual inflation rates is due to a few 
prices shocks: there were large price 
increases in 2003, 2006 and 2010, which 
(so far) have not been followed by large 
price decreases. Figure 8 also shows 
several periods with a strong seasonal 
pattern, but price changes are small, at 
least in relative terms, and only last for a 
couple of months. The role of price 
shocks is highlighted by depicting prices 
and price peaks (see Figure 8). Since 
there is overall inflation, one should 
expect an upward drift in price levels. 
Nevertheless, the price shocks are 
undoubtedly the main drivers of the 
upward movements in prices; after a price 
shock they always stay at a higher level.  
The increase in rice prices has 
affected large parts of the country. The 
reported Lao rice prices are used when 
calculating the consumer price index. 
These are collected in large markets of 
provincial capitals and not in rural areas 
or small towns. Since the rice market in 
Laos is perceived to be highly segmented, 
and rice prices in remote rural areas differ 
due to transport costs, there is uncertainty 
regarding measurement of the impacts of 
rice inflation. According to the Lao 
National Statistics Bureau, however, rice 
prices should be broadly representative 
for major rice-growing areas and hence 
for most of the population. Disaggregated 
and regional data are typically not shared. 
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Figure 8: Swings in glutinous rice prices in real terms last for years and are not 
seasonal 
Monthly real glutinous rice inflation Actual and peak real prices of glutinous rice 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau and staff estimates. 
 
The left graph show the month-on-month real glutinous rice inflation from January 2000 to December 2010 based on 
consumer price index data (January 2010=100). Visible are seasonal factors in the ± 10 percent range. Prices typically 
peak in August and, with the beginning of the harvest period, decline in November. There are extreme monthly jumps in 
2006 and in 2010. The right graph shows that after any given price shock prices, measured in Kip per kg, stay high.  
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Glutinous price Peak value
There is a lack of good regional price 
data, but the available price series show 
similar patterns. The Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce also collects price 
information for five province capitals on 
various types of rice. This information is 
sometimes available at disaggregated 
levels, which allows comparing the 
evolution of regional price trends. Figure 
9 shows average prices for glutinous 
paddy over January 2006 to February 
2011. Even though price levels vary 
across the country, as documented by van 
der Weide (2006), the price series follow 
each other closely in major cities. 
Moreover, all prices rose sharply in 2010, 
though somewhat less in Louang 
Prabang, a city in the Northern region. 
Another striking feature of Figure 9 is the 
long periods with stable prices. Even 
though this to some extent is an artifact of 
rounding to the nearest 1,000 Kip, the 
quality of the data is questionable. During 
some periods the series do not show any 
movements, which is unlikely for prices 
in a market economy. The gaps also exist 
because it is challenging for the 
authorities to compile the information for 
all regions. 
Overall, for the last five years, the 
evolution of glutinous and non-glutinous 
rice prices differs substantially. It is 
essential to distinguish between non-
glutinous rice, which is consumed in 
relatively small quantities, and glutinous 
rice, the staple food. Glutinous rice prices 
rose sharply during 2010 and are still 
high, even though they have declined 
recently, while non-glutinous rice prices 
have been modest. Moreover, in Laos the 
volatility of glutinous rice prices is a 
major determinant of food price inflation. 
At the same time, recent food and rice 
price increases do not constitute a major 
threat to overall price stability. Consumer 
price inflation stood at 6.0 percent in 
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Figure 9: Regional paddy price trends follow each other 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
 
The graph shows regional paddy prices from January 2006 to February 2011 measured in Kip per kg. The figure shows 
that regional price trends move in par. Also visible are data gaps and constant prices over prolonged time periods, 
suggesting data quality issues. 
2010. However, the large rice-price 
increases during 2010 created uncertainty 
among government and market actors, 
and had welfare and distributional effects. 
It is thus vital to understand why these 
prices rose so sharply.  
Macroeconomic impacts of rice 
inflation are small but need monitoring 
World food inflation does not constitute a 
major challenge for macroeconomic 
stability in the short-run. Overall inflation 
rates are moderate but rising (recorded at 
9.2 percent in April 2011). In several 
developing countries, the food price crisis 
in 2006-2008, in combination with high 
oil prices, created macroeconomic 
instability in the form of high inflation, 
exchange rate instability and current 
account deficits. But the impact on Laos 
was limited. So far current world food 
inflation does not seem to have affected 
Laos much either, even though 
international trade has increased and the 
country gradually becomes more 
integrated with the world economy. Price 
transmission is slow because it goes from 
the international to the regional market, 
and then from the regional market, to the 
domestic market. 
In the medium run, world food prices 
may well transmit into the domestic 
market. Some degree of regional food 
price transmission is already evident 
through the observed rise in relative food 
prices observed in Figure 2.12 Glutinous 
rice price changes have a strong impact 
on domestic inflation, particularly food 
inflation. In fact, glutinous rice is the food 
item that has the strongest impact on 
domestic consumer prices, both directly 
due to its weight and indirectly due to its 
role as staple food. Since the evolution of 
glutinous rice prices is determined in the 
                                                 
12 See also Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis. 
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Table 1: Approximate welfare impacts suggest negative effects of rice price 
increases in the Northern region and for urban population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region 
 
Estimated short-run household welfare impact                   
from December 2009 to December 2010 
 
(in percent of initial household income) 
 
Urban Rural (with road) Rural (remote) 
VIENTIANE -1.4 9.2 NA 
NORTH -0.6 0.7 -3.2 
  Phongsaly -1.0 -2.8 -3.6 
  Luangnamtha -1.3 3.4 -6.5 
  Oudomxay -2.9 -2.2 -3.1 
  Bokeo -0.0 11.4 9.2 
  Luangprabang -2.4 -0.8 -3.1 
  Huaphanh -2.6 0.0 -1.4 
  Xayabury 3.0 1.4 -6.7 
CENTRAL 2.4 3.6 -3.3 
  Xiengkhuang 2.3 4.0 -5.1 
  Borikhamxy -2.4 2.7 -2.0 
  Khammuane -2.2 -0.5 0.6 
  Svannakhet 3.7 4.8 -3.9 
SOUTH -1.3 -0.3 4.2 
  Saravane -2.3 -0.0 -2.8 
  Sekong -4.3 -5.8 10.5 
  Champsak -0.9 0.0 3.9 
  Attapeu -1.2 -0.0 1.1 
Source: LECS4 data based on Davis and Baulch (2011) and staff calculations. 
region, at least over periods of a couple of 
years, the 2010 inflation spurt is probably 
a regional phenomenon. Non-glutinous 
rice prices also impact consumer prices, 
but more modestly.   
Price stability depends critically on 
glutinous rice prices. Both domestic 
glutinous and non-glutinous rice prices 
are currently stable. But international 
food prices are highly volatile and have 
reached all-time highs. Oil prices are well 
over US$100 and might continue to 
increase.  Moreover, the development of 
the regional glutinous rice markets 
remains unclear. Hence, there is great 
uncertainty about how food and fuel 
prices will impact the macro-economy 
over the next couple of years. 
Macroeconomic policy measures also 
need to be based on the extent that 
commodity price increases feed into 
wages, and can create inflationary 
expectations, which are often viewed as 
one of the most important contributors to 
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inflation. Current rice price inflation in 
Laos is also taking place in the context of 
already high private credit growth, which 
itself contributes to overall inflationary 
pressures of consumer prices. All this 
suggests a need for close monitoring.  
Marginally positive overall welfare 
impacts of rice price increases, but 
urban and food-deficient areas lose 
Rice inflation has marginally positive 
overall welfare impacts. Household 
survey data suggest that the overall net 
welfare impacts of rice price increases 
from 2009-2010 are marginally positive. 
A uniform 10 percent increase in rice 
prices raises ‘average’ household welfare 
by 3.3 percent.13 Households thus on an 
average gain from high rice prices.  
But urban and some food deficit areas 
are hurt. Higher prices benefit the 
average rural household at the expense of 
urban and food-deficit households. 
Looking beyond national averages, as 
documented in Table 1, suggests that 
actual welfare effects vary by remoteness 
and province (though the results for some 
areas seem implausible and could be an 
indication of data quality issues). Areas 
where households produce rice surpluses, 
generally gain from price increase, urban 
households suffer slightly, while remote 
rural households, mostly in the food-
deficient Northern provinces, no doubt 
are  negatively affected. These findings 
are consistent with analysis on rice 
inflation undertaken for neighboring 
countries and previous work for Laos 
(World Bank, 2009).14  
                                                 
13 The methodology of the welfare approximations 
is documented in the annex. 
14 On the distributional patterns of glutinous rice 
inflation, Takamatsu (2011) finds that the negative 
welfare changes for urban households do not vary 
much by expenditure quintiles. But the size of the 
4. TRADTIONAL SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND FACTORS ARE MINOR 
CAUSES OF RICE INFLATION 
This chapter discusses potential 
determinants of rice price inflation. 
Several potential explanations have been 
suggested for the 2010 price hike. They 
range from purely seasonal factors, large 
supply shocks, increases in aggregate 
demand, expansionary monetary policy, 
increases in input prices, hoarding by 
government institutions, and speculations 
by millers and traders. One cannot rule 
out some contribution of domestic rice 
supply shocks in the light of data 
uncertainty. But the main finding is that 
none of these are plausible enough to 
explain major price peaks of 50 percent 
inflation. 
Seasonality effects are existent but of 
small magnitude 
Seasonal differences between rice prices 
in Laos are relatively modest. Among the 
most straightforward explanations for 
staple food price fluctuations are seasonal 
changes in domestic supply. In Laos, 
however, their magnitude is only of 
intermediate importance. For instance, 
intra-seasonal differences between 
maximum and minimum prices of maize 
in Southern Africa are usually between 25 
and 100 percent (Chapota and Jayne, 
2009). Differences between maximum 
and minimum glutinous rice prices in 
Laos are much smaller, around 10 percent 
according to average wholesale prices.15 
                                                                     
positive welfare increases in rural areas is higher 
for the more wealthy households. 
15 This estimate is probably at the lower end as it 
is based on aggregated prices. Yet, individual 
market prices, collected by Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce, move even less.   
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On the other hand, over the past decade, 
inter-seasonal fluctuations, well above 10 
percent (same month across years) have 
been common.  
Seasonal rice price fluctuations exist 
even in well-functioning markets. It is 
worthy to note that while fluctuations in 
rice prices are considered a problem, they 
fulfill the role of adjusting production to 
changes in demand and supply. Hence, 
even in well-functioning markets for 
staple foods, prices vary over the season. 
Past supply shocks do not show strong 
correlation with rice prices 
There is little correlation between 
changes in rice supply and prices. Bad 
harvests increase prices while good 
harvests reduce prices. But as Figure 1 in 
chapter 2 shows, according to official 
estimates the harvest has increased every 
year since 2000, except in 2003 when it 
declined by 1.7 percent. As described 
above, there was a significant price 
increase in 2003, indicating a supply 
shock, but the price increases in 2006 and 
2010 do not coincide with declines in 
harvests in 2005 and 2009. 
None of the data seem to contain 
supply shocks that are large enough to be 
the main cause of the huge price 
fluctuations. However, since the official 
estimates of harvests are known to be 
uncertain and likely to have substantial 
margins of errors, it is hard to assess the 
true role of supply shocks. An indication 
of uncertainty is that estimates from the 
Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) and the World Food Program 
(WFP) suggest that the harvest in 2010 
will be 6 percent lower than in 2009 
(FAO/WFP, 2011), differing substantially 
from government forecasts. Nonetheless, 
taken at face value, none of the data seem 
to contain any supply shocks that are 
large enough to cause glutinous prices to 
increase by 50 percent annually. 
It also seems unlikely that jumps in 
the marketed share generated the 
observed inflation dynamics. Changes in 
marketed shares of the harvest can be a 
cause of price fluctuations, but it is 
challenging to empirically evaluate their 
importance. A more subtle argument in 
favor of supply shocks is based on the 
fact that farmers use most glutinous rice 
for self-consumption, and that small 
changes in harvests, or expectations of 
future harvests, can potentially produce 
large changes in both supply and demand 
for rice. The reason is that farmers retain 
a larger share of their produce when 
harvests are small, reducing supply, and a 
larger number of households fail to 
produce a sufficient amount of rice, thus 
increasing the demand for rice (Bourdet, 
2000). Yet, it is not at all certain that the 
dynamics described are correct. Although 
glutinous rice is the staple food, it is 
possible that high market prices induce 
farmers to sell more rice, replacing it in 
their diet with other types of food. Since 
the amount of rice retained for own 
consumption is so much larger than the 
marketed rice, small changes in diets 
might stabilize supply, and subsequently 
prices.16 Moreover, the demand effect 
might be small because farmers who lack 
rice also lack buying power. Since there 
is a paucity of information on marketed 
rice and the structure of the rice market, 
the relevance of these two hypotheses is 
hard to evaluate, though currently no 
credible market information supports the 
claim that high retention caused the 2010 
price inflation. 
                                                 
16 Around 88 percent is retained according to Hill 
and Christiaensen (2006). 
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Increased demand over the past decade 
does not explain fluctuations 
Changes in aggregate demand do not 
explain the fluctuations either. There are 
several reasons why demand for rice 
could have increased. Economic growth 
increases household income and thus 
aggregate demand. Laos has had growth 
rates in the 7-8 percent range since 2004. 
One argument why higher income might 
generate more demand for glutinous rice 
rather than other goods is that about one 
third of the population is thought to be 
temporarily food-insecure. It cannot 
satisfy their demand for rice during parts 
of the year (WFP, 2007; FAO/WFP, 
2011). But there are two countervailing 
arguments. First, average yearly GDP 
growth has been high for ten years, and 
there are no obvious demand shocks that 
can explain sudden price hikes, such as 
the one in 2010. Second, demand for 
glutinous rice, as staple food in general, is 
relatively income inelastic, as it does not 
grow in line with income (Bourdet, 
2000).  
Also the role of beer production and 
high-potential growth sectors for rice 
demand is small. Other potential sources 
of demand are Beer Lao, that uses rice to 
brew beer, and mining companies that 
buy rice for their employees, but they are 
of minor importance. Beer Lao is a big 
buyer of rice, close to 10,000 tons in 
2010, but it mainly buys non-glutinous 
rice, and thus has little impact on 
glutinous rice prices. Moreover, a 
substantial part is imported from 
Thailand, where milled non-glutinous rice 
tends to be cheaper (EMC, 2011). Mining 
is capital intensive and only 0.6 percent 
of Lao households were involved in the 
mining and hydropower sectors in 2007 
to 2008 (Fenton and Lindlow, 2010). 
Hence, the number of employees in 
mining is not large enough to have a 
nation-wide impact on rice prices. 
Increasing input prices do not explain 
rice price increases either. The costs of 
fertilizer have risen significantly, as oil 
prices have surged. However, fertilizers 
and pesticides are not widely used by Lao 
farmers (FAO/MAF, 2009). Another 
input is seeds, but optimally farmers 
should change them every four years, and 
in practice do it less often. Moreover, 
government institutions dominate the 
seed market, and there is no information 
about recent large price increases. 
Monetary policy does not explain 
sudden price jumps 
There is an overall lack of correlation 
between aggregate credit supply and rice 
prices. Expansionary monetary policy is 
sometimes believed to cause food price 
increases. The mechanism goes through 
reduced interest rates and improved 
access to credit, which reduces the cost of 
storage for market actors, such as millers 
and traders. As a result, storage increases, 
supply drops, and prices may increase or 
even over-shoot. This hypothesis has 
been put forward by Frankel (2006) to 
explain changes in world commodity 
prices. But the pattern of credit growth is 
not consistent with price changes. Private 
sector credit has grown rapidly during 
recent years (an increase of about 80 
percent yearly between 2008 and 2010 
according to the IMF, 2011). It thus could 
be a potential cause of price increases 
(also impacting on the price of land). Yet, 
there is no reason why several years of 
easy credit should generate the observed 
sudden price shock in 2010. Thus, the 
overall lack of correlation between credit 
supply and prices rules out expansionary 
monetary policy as a major driver of rice 
price inflation. 
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Hoarding and speculation are unlikely  
There is no evidence suggesting major 
increases in government purchases 
caused the price increase. Another 
potential cause for price increases could 
be hoarding by government institutions. 
For example, the State Food Enterprise 
buys rice for government staff during 
harvests and sells stocks during shortages 
(World Bank, 2009). However, it appears 
to have not been very active in storing 
large quantities of rice recently. 
Government agencies, such as the army 
and police, also buy rice from millers 
using quotas, which are allocated to 
millers at a price fixed early in the season. 
While the size of the quota market is not 
insignificant,17 field evidence in the main 
rice-producing provinces does not 
indicate a significant jump in the quota 
market share. 
Speculation among farmers, millers 
and traders had a limited or no effect on 
non-gluttonous rice. Although 
speculation due to the availability of 
cheap credit seems unlikely, expectations 
about future harvests might matter. In 
2010, glutinous rice prices started to 
increase between May and June, and this 
coincided with the beginning of the main 
wet season, complemented by localized 
droughts and flooding towards the end of 
it. For some observers this may have led 
to hoarding of rice, and is a major reason 
for price increases according to 
FAO/WFP (2011). Yet, speculation 
should also have affected non-glutinous 
rice prices. But they only rose by 10 
percent. It is of course possible that non-
gluttonous rice prices are determined by 
world market prices, while glutinous 
prices are determined by demand and 
supply in the local market, but there is no 
                                                 
17 Some observers estimate the quota market share 
between 10 to 25 percent. 
obvious reason as to why this should be 
the case.     Finally, one cannot rule out 
that millers and traders stored large 
amounts of paddy while prices were 
rising, but then prices should have 
declined before the harvest, as there is no 
point in holding on to stocks when prices 
are expected to fall. Prices started to 
decline slowly in October, as expected, 
and were well above previous year’s 
values in late February, so large stocks do 
not seem to have been released.  
5. RICE TRADE AND POLICY AS 
MAJOR CAUSE OF RICE 
INFLATION  
The most likely cause behind the mid-
2010 price increase is significant exports 
of milled glutinous rice to Vietnam and 
paddy to Thailand. This chapter argues 
that regional trade, and domestic trade 
policy, plays a crucial role in the 
determination of both glutinous and non-
glutinous rice prices. Several pieces of 
empirical evidence suggest that trade 
triggers price increases, which are likely 
reinforced by ad hoc trade policy 
decisions. By contrast, it is challenging to 
obtain credible and consistent support for 
other hypotheses outlined in the previous 
section. This of course does not imply 
that supply shocks and speculation, are 
entirely unimportant. In principle it is 
possible that major supply shocks are 
regional. They could affect Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam simultaneously.18 
                                                 
18 This could have been the case in 2010 when 
floods, which may have caused crop damages for 
glutinous rice, hit Northeastern Thailand. Thus, 
future analysis should look at Thai glutinous rice 
production trends and see to what extent they 
explain price volatility. This is because trade may 
be the proximate cause of Lao price spikes, but 
volatility in Thai production may be the original 
cause. 
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Figure 10: Glutinous rice trade to Vietnam is associated with price jumps 
 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Industry and Commerce and National Statistical Bureau. 
 
The graph shows percentage increases of month-to-month glutinous rice inflation and official glutinous rice exports to 
Vietnam from October 2005 to December 2010. In the graph exports have been lagged by 6 months to highlight the 
relationship. Visible is that the rice inflation peaks in 2006 and 2010 are closely associated with large exports to Vietnam. 
Trade data for Thailand shows similar patterns but the magnitude of officially registered exports is very small when 
compared to Vietnam. 
 
Speculation could thus play some role as 
it would then be as a response to 
anticipated regional supply shocks. 
Further study is needed to disentangle 
their importance.  
 
Market information suggests large 
commercial exports to Vietnam 
One striking piece of evidence comes 
from market information directly 
obtained from traders. Millers and 
retailers were interviewed in three major 
rice-producing provinces, Champasak, 
Savannakhet and Khammuane. They all 
exported large quantities of rice to 
Vietnam after the 2009 October-
November harvest. Millers also exported 
rice to Vietnam during the previous 
seasons, mostly selling directly to 
Vietnamese traders. These amounts were 
substantial; on average about one to three 
thirds of total milling output. Some 
retailers had also sold rice to Vietnamese 
traders, but mostly in small amounts. 
Government export restrictions imposed 
in mid-2010 reduced formal exports 
substantially.   
Government actively encouraged 
exports to Vietnam during 2009 to early 
2010. Vietnamese traders have been 
active in Laos for a long time, and the 
links to Vietnam are strong, both 
politically and because some households 
are of Vietnamese origin. To export rice, 
traders need to obtain an export quota, 
which is issued by provincial 
governments. The practice varies across 
provinces, partly due to local rice 
surpluses. During the 2009 season it was 
in general easy to obtain large export 
quotas, possibly because the harvest was 
considered large enough to cover 
domestic needs. The intention of boosting 
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Map 2: Rice price inflation is highest in producing areas that also trade with 
Vietnam and Thailand 
 
Source: Staff estimates based on LECS3 and LECS4. 
The map shows average annual glutinous rice inflation over 2003 to 2008. 
The parts of Laos that are believed to be most active in producing and 
exporting glutinous rice to Vietnam and Thailand are located in the Central 
and Southern part of the country. In particular, areas where the highest 
levels of inflation are observed are rice producing areas and areas located at 
important border crossings. 
exports to Vietnam was also reported in 
newspapers (Vientiane Times, June 
2010). It also was mentioned that the 
government was storing rice to ensure it 
could meet its export targets. It further 
stated that according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, there is a great deal of 
informal exports (actual size is unknown), 
which causes problems for the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce in its attempts 
to manage prices in the domestic market 
through export regulation.  
The strongest evidence for the 
importance of exports to Vietnam comes 
from official government trade data. Even 
though data on official exports of rice to 
Vietnam may severely underestimate the 
size of exports, the pattern is striking.  
Figure 10 shows monthly glutinous rice-
price inflation and monthly exports to 
Vietnam for October 2005 to December 
2010, the period for which data are 
available. Exports have been lagged by 
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Figure 11: Proximity to Thai border results in higher paddy price inflation 
 
Source: Staff estimates based on LECS3 and LECS4.  
The graphs show average annual glutinous paddy inflation from 2003-2008 plotted against distance measured in hours 
of travel time to nearest border crossing to Thailand (left) and Vietnam (right). The graphs show that moving away from 
the Thai border results in almost a 2 percent drop in paddy inflation. The results are significant because it can be 
shown moving away from provincial capitals would result in less than 1 percent inflation. By contrast inflation peaks at 
about 4 hours travel distance to Vietnam because glutinous rice is imported from production zones in this distance. 
six months to highlight the relationship.19 
Large exports preceded the price 
increases both in 2006 and in 2010. The 
time period between exports and price 
rises are due to the seasonal pattern. After 
the main harvest in October and 
November, there is rice available in the 
market, supported by the much smaller 
harvest of irrigated rice in April and May, 
but then prices start to rise in July. 
Vietnamese demand coincides with 
celebration of New Year in January or 
February. It could also be due to the 
availability of rice after the wet harvest at 
the end of the year. 
Survey data also confirms the 
importance of trade in price transmission. 
Map 2 and Figure 11 show the spatial 
patterns of average annual glutinous rice 
inflation between 2003 and 2008. Rice 
                                                 
19 The six-month lag can be explained by the fact 
that prices rise when there are shortages, not when 
the rice is sold. While the magnitude of the 
recorded trade is small, it must be remembered 
that traded market volumes are small and there is 
large unrecorded trade. 
inflation has been highest in rice 
producing areas that reportedly trade with 
Vietnam and Thailand (Sengua and 
others, 2009). This coincides with 
relatively high glutinous rice price 
increases in both countries during this 
period. By contrast, average annual 
inflation is much lower in the Northern 
part of the country and around Vientiane, 
the capital of Laos.20 
Why glutinous rice from Laos is of 
interest to Vietnam 
There is widespread skepticism about the 
competiveness of Laos in the 
international rice market. Demand for 
glutinous rice is at best limited to the 
region, where Thailand and Vietnam, the 
world’s two largest rice exporters are 
located. In addition, there are claims that 
                                                 
20 Nevertheless it should be noted that trade is not 
the only factor explaining this patterns. Further 
study is needed to distinguish other effects; such 
for example improved infrastructure investments. 
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poor marketing infrastructure severely 
limits Laos’ overall export competiveness 
(see for example ADB, 2006). At the 
same time, some observers note that there 
is limited information about the regional 
glutinous rice market to evaluate this 
claim. 
The rice exported to Vietnam comes 
from the main rice-growing provinces, 
Field evidence, as well as spatial survey 
data documented in Map 2, suggests that 
Vietnamese traders source their rice from 
large millers in the main rice-growing 
provinces. This is also consistent with the 
findings of Hill and Christiansen (2006) 
showing that farmers located in districts 
near the Vietnamese border are less 
engaged in crop sales than others.  
Yet, there is a natural demand for Lao 
rice in Vietnam for various reasons. One 
reason why Vietnam imports rice is that 
Laos is closer to the North of Vietnam 
than the large rice-producing area, the 
Mekong delta in the South. As a result of 
its elongated shape, and the long distance 
between the North and the South of 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese rice market is 
highly segmented (Baulch and others, 
2008). The main rise-producing areas in 
Central and Southern Laos are close and 
connected with relatively good roads, 
although the border between Laos and 
Vietnam is in a mountainous area.21 For 
instance, it takes only a couple of hours to 
drive from Thakek, the capital of the 
province with the largest rice surpluses, 
Khammuane, to the border town Mu Gip. 
Moreover, because of close cultural ties 
and an estimated large number of ethnic 
Vietnamese or Lao with Vietnamese 
ancestry, trucks from Vietnam regularly 
                                                 
21 To this should be added that road infrastructure 
has improved in recent years, thus facilitating 
trade flows. In the 2009 crop seasons there was 
also a damage of the Vietnamese harvest because 
of a tropical cyclone. 
deliver goods to cities in Laos, and back-
loading with rice can improve profits 
compared to returning empty, even when 
price differences are small.   
Substantial amounts of glutinous rice 
are consumed in Vietnam. It is a common 
view that only people in Laos and the 
northeast of Thailand consume glutinous 
rice, and that the market outside this area 
is almost negligible (Bourdet, 2000). 
However, although glutinous rice is not 
the staple food in other East and South 
East Asian countries, it is consumed on 
special occasions.  In Vietnam, for 
example, it is used to prepare breakfast 
meals and sweets, as well as for 
production of cookies and other products. 
Demand is particularly high during the 
Lunar New Year (Tet Nguyen Dan), 
which always falls in January or 
February. According to the Vietnamese 
living standard surveys annual 
consumption is over five kg per person. 
Since there are 86 million Vietnamese, 
total demand for glutinous rice might 
have been at some 430,000 tons in 2009. 
This amount is so large that shortfalls in 
production, or price differential, should 
spill over to the Lao market. One must 
also account for the fact that glutinous 
rice production reportedly has decreased 
in Vietnam, as farmers switch to ordinary 
rice for the export market. Some Lao 
glutinous rice may also be exported from 
Vietnam to China, where demand for 
glutinous rice also exists. 
Actual exports to Vietnam are much 
larger than official exports, though the 
actual magnitude is unknown. Borders are 
porous and export restrictions affect 
traders. As rice exports drove up prices 
during 2010, the government tightened up 
the restrictions on exports.  Though some 
millers have export quotas to Vietnam, 
and other countries, and there are illegal 
exports, national export ‘bans’ clearly 
affect millers. This was observed during 
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Map 3: Paddy price inflation is highest in areas that trade with Thailand  
 
Source: Staff estimates based on LECS3 and LECS4. 
The map shows average annual glutinous paddy inflation over 2003 to 2008. 
The parts of Laos that are believed to be most active in producing and 
exporting glutinous rice abroad are located in the Central and Southern part 
of the country along the border of Thailand. In particular, areas where the 
highest levels of inflation are observed are the rice producing areas located 
at important border crossings. 
the field trip. Several millers had large 
stocks of rice specifically for the export 
market. The consequences of the export 
restrictions have also been reported in the 
media (Vientiane Times, March 2011): 
millers’ inability to export leads to losses 
as domestic prices are low relative to 
what they paid for the paddy. 
The reason for large sudden exports 
to Vietnam is the availability of export 
quotas. They typically reflect good 
harvests in Laos. The two periods with 
large price increases coincide with large 
official exports to Vietnam. The 
procedure of distributing export quotas to 
millers and traders is not transparent. 
Both the central government and 
provincial governments are involved. 
However, official data on harvests for 
2005 and 2009 indicate that they were 
larger than previous years. Hence, it is 
likely that part of the surges in exports to 
Vietnam can be attributed to Lao trade 
policy implemented at the national and 
provincial level. 
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Paddy trade with Thailand is mostly 
undocumented 
A large part of the trade with Thailand 
consists of informal cross-border exports 
of paddy, and reported re-imports of 
milled high-quality rice. A long stretch of 
the border between Laos and Thailand is 
made up of the Mekong River, and paddy 
rice can easily and informally be 
transported to Thailand. There are several 
reasons why it might be profitable to 
export paddy to Thailand. First, Thailand 
has minimum prices, which often are 
higher than Lao prices. Second, milling is 
more efficient and recovery rates are 
higher. It is estimated that well over 60 
percent of the paddy is recovered in 
Thailand while many mills in Laos 
recover close to 50 percent. Third, 
Thailand has excess capacity in the 
milling sector (Bangkok Post, November 
2010). Fourth, Lao rice can be re-
exported back to Laos as Thai rice, and 
fetch a higher price than Lao rice.   
There is no reliable information about 
the size of exports to Thailand. But in 
2010 prices rose in both Laos and 
Thailand. Figure 12 shows that Thai and 
Lao prices of glutinous paddy, measured 
in Kip per kg, followed each other fairly 
well from January 2006 to February 2011. 
In particular, the 2010 price hike and 
decline first occurred in Thailand. Prices 
started to rise somewhat earlier there and 
rose to a higher level. Figure 12 also 
compares Lao retail prices of glutinous 
Figure 12: Lao glutinous paddy is competitive 
Lao glutinous paddy prices are more competitive than Thai 
paddy… 
…but Lao milled glutinous rice prices are more 
expensive than in Thailand 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Industry and Commerce and Thai 
ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
 
The graph shows ‘farm gate’ paddy prices from January 
2006 to February 2011 measured in Kip per kg. The Thai 
prices are converted into Kip using the nominal effective 
exchange rate. 
 
Source: Lao Ministry of Industry and Commerce and 
Thai ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
 
The graph shows retail (Laos first grade) and 
wholesale (Thailand 10% broken) milled rice prices 
from January 2006 to December 2010 measured in 
Kip per kg. The Thai prices are converted into Kip 
using the nominal effective exchange rate. 
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Figure 13: Lao and Thai glutinous rice prices share the same long-run trend 
 
 
Source: Lao National Statistical Bureau and Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
 
The graph shows the natural logarithm of retail (Lao first grade) and wholesale (Thai 10% broken) milled rice prices from 
January 1990 to December 2010 measured in Kip per kg.  
rice (grade 1) with Thai long grain (10 
percent broken) glutinous rice wholesale 
prices, also measured in Kip per kg. The 
decline in Thai prices in 2007 and 2008 
did not transmit to Laos. Although the 
prices reported might not be for exactly 
the same type of good, a striking feature 
is that Lao paddy prices are typically 
cheaper than Thai paddy prices. By 
contrast, Lao milled glutinous rice is 
significantly more expensive than Thai 
milled glutinous rice, Consequently, there 
is a strong incentive to export paddy to 
Thailand as documented in Map 3. It also 
shows that average annual inflation from 
2003 to 2008 has been highest in paddy 
producing areas that trade with Thailand. 
Inflation has been particularly high 
around major border crossings. 
In the long run, Lao and Thai 
glutinous rice prices have the same trend. 
This is best illustrated by graphing the 
glutinous rice price series in logarithmic 
scale.22 Figure 13 illustrates that the Lao 
and Thai glutinous rice prices share the 
same long-run trend. A formal test indeed 
indicates that both price series are co-
integrated.23 In the long run about 90 
percent of the price changes in Thailand 
are transmitted to Laos (see also Annex). 
These findings are robust in the sense that 
using different price series does not affect 
the results. These findings can also be 
confirmed with glutinous paddy prices.  
Thai glutinous rice prices determine 
Lao prices in the long run. Thai prices, 
which should reflect regional market 
                                                 
22 Using logs highlights the long-run relationship, 
as constant growth rates are turned into linear 
growth rates.  
23 The Engle-Granger co-integration test statistic 
is -3.9 and close to be significant at the one 
percent level. The long-run relationship between 
the log of Lao and Thai prices is 
. 
 
.   0. , 0.2Lao ThailnP  1 27 91 lnP R 98  
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Figure 14: Short-run correlation between Thai and Lao glutinous rice prices varies 
over time and reached a historical peak in 2006-2008 
 
 
Source: Staff estimates based on Lao National Statistical Bureau and Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
 
The graph shows time-varying correlation between the volatility of Thai and Lao first grade glutinous rice prices from 
March 1990 to December 2010. The ‘rolling estimates’ are based on an autoregressive econometric model documented in 
the annex. The  short-run correlation explains on average about 20 percent of price transmission. During 2008-2010 
market linkages have intensified as short-run correlation explains more than 40 percent of price transmission. 
 
prices, determine Lao prices in the long 
run. In 2009, Thailand produced an 
estimated 6 million ton of glutinous rice 
and exported about 450,000 tons. Laos’ 
total rice harvest (including non-glutinous 
rice) is slightly over 3 million ton, out of 
which most was for self-consumption. It 
is thus reasonable to believe that Thai 
prices influence Lao prices, and not vice 
versa. In fact, formal statistical analysis 
confirms these findings. In a statistical 
sense Thai prices indeed cause Lao prices 
(see Annex). Moreover, price 
transmission is found to be asymmetric. 
Glutinous rice price increases are 
transmitted much more rapidly than price 
decreases (Figure 7). It is also reasonable 
to believe that Thai prices reflect regional 
(East Asian) prices of glutinous rice, but 
further study of regional rice markets is 
warranted.  The link with Thai prices thus 
severely limits the Lao government’s 
ability to manage prices over periods of a 
couple of years.  
In the short-run, the percentage 
difference between Lao and Thai 
glutinous rice prices varies a great deal. 
The short-run correlation in price 
volatility is on average 0.2. But Figure 14 
shows that there are several shifts from 
plus 0.4 to almost zero. The period 2008 
to 2010 was particularly volatile; 
probably because of the aftermath of the 
first global food crisis, several 
government interventions in rice markets, 
and the following financial crisis. In 
particular, Thai government guaranteed 
high minimum prices for paddy in 2008 
even though food prices were already 
high.24  
To conclude, the available empirical 
evidence points to international trade as 
the main proximate cause for high 
glutinous rice price inflation. But due to 
knowledge gaps about the functioning of 
                                                 
24 An attempt was made to prevent paddy from 
entering into Thailand from Laos. Thailand itself 
did not impose trade restrictions. 
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the rice market, many the details about 
the price transmission mechanisms are 
largely unexplored. Lao glutinous rice 
prices are determined by regional supply 
and demand, at least when viewed over 
the period 1990 to 2010. Higher glutinous 
rice prices in Vietnam most likely lead 
large exports,25 and there is a strong link 
between Lao and Thai prices through 
paddy exports, and re-imports of milled 
glutinous rice, though price changes are 
often volatile and at times transmitted 
slowly. Nonetheless, the knowledge of 
how the regional market for glutinous rice 
works is sketchy. From a policy 
perspective there is a need to analyze 
regional price transmission mechanisms 
further, particularly since Laos plans to 
trade rice freely in 2015 within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) free trade area.26 Under these 
arrangements Laos is in principle obliged 
to drop its current import tariff on rice 
from other ASEAN countries from 5 
percent to zero in 2015. The applied rate 
is the same for both paddy and milled 
rice. Vietnam will do the same; Thailand 
already reduced the tariff on rice to zero 
in 2010. Formal cross-border rice trade 
may thus increase over time. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Information about glutinous rice prices for 
Northern Vietnam markets is available, and 
market information and some price data for 2009 
to 2010 confirm these findings. 
26 One possibility is that trade to Vietnam may 
drive short-term Lao rice price inflation, whereas 
Thai trade drives medium to long-run 
developments. This suggests that the government 
does not have much control over domestic market 
prices. Price interventions will thus not be an 
effective policy instrument. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this note was to identify 
lessons for policy from the recent 
glutinous rice price hike. Price 
fluctuations are a normal attribute and 
necessary requisite for a competitive 
market. When a commodity becomes 
scarce its price rises, which induces a fall 
in consumption, and eventually more 
investment in production. But the 
efficiency of the price system can break 
down when price movements are subject 
to extreme swings. Understandably, the 
main rationale for policy intervention is 
often market failure and addressing 
potentially negative welfare implications. 
The main findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 Traditional supply and demand factors 
can explain only a small part of the 
2010 glutinous rice price inflation. 
Domestic rice supply shocks might 
only to a limited extent have 
contributed to sudden rice inflation. 
Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty 
about aggregate production data. One 
can effectively discount a large role of 
seasonality effects, decreases in 
marketed shares of the harvest, and 
increases in aggregate demand in 
explaining rice inflation. Increased 
credit supply and hoarding can also be 
ruled out as major drivers of rice price 
inflation. 
 
 Regional trade appears as the main 
proximate cause for high glutinous 
rice prices. Large official rice exports 
to Vietnam preceded the price jumps 
both in 2006 and 2010. Rice inflation 
has been highest in areas that trade 
with Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam 
trade seems to drive short-run price 
fluctuations in particular whereas trade 
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to Thailand drives medium to long-run 
rice inflation. There appears to be a 
strong incentive to export milled rice 
to Vietnam and paddy to Thailand.  
 
 Future analysis should look closer at 
the role of regional supply shocks for 
the determination of glutinous rice 
prices. In principle, it is possible that 
major supply shocks are regional. 
They could thus affect Laos, Thailand 
and Vietnam simultaneously. 
Speculation could play a role, as it 
could be as a response to anticipated 
regional supply shocks. Trade could be 
thus a likely proximate cause of Lao 
price spikes, but volatility in Thai and 
Vietnamese production—and other 
factors explaining prices in 
neighboring countries—may be the 
original cause.  Future analysis should 
look at Thai and Vietnamese glutinous 
rice production trends and analyze to 
what extent they can explain Lao price 
volatility.  
 
 Glutinous rice price increases may 
have been reinforced by ad hoc trade 
policy decisions. The fact that periods 
of large rice price hikes coincide with 
large official exports to Vietnam is 
also attributed to ad hoc national and 
provincial trade policy decisions, 
which are temporarily favoring 
exports, but then reverse and restrict 
exports. 
 
 In Laos, high rice prices tend to have 
marginally overall positive welfare 
impacts. In particular, rural rice 
farmers in major rice producing 
regions gain from rice increases. High 
prices also present an opportunity to 
stimulate production and enhance the 
role of rice for economic growth and 
rural poverty reduction. Higher rice 
prices can also help induce private 
sector and donor investment in the 
Laotian rice sector, especially in the 
milling sector which is rather outdated.  
 
 There is an important regional niche 
market for Lao glutinous rice. 
Consequently there is substantial trade 
to neighboring countries. Glutinous 
rice production in Laos appears to be 
marginally competitive at the regional 
level, possibly due to specific market 
characteristics. Regional glutinous rice 
trade flows with the two major rice 
producing giants Vietnam and 
Thailand are not a threat, but should be 
interpreted as a major opportunity. 
 
Against this background, it appears that 
current price interventions may not be 
effective. At best, the overall impact and 
efficiency of current policy responses are 
uncertain. Apart from an ongoing general 
policy of increasing domestic rice 
production, the government response to 
the glutinous price hike has three 
components: (i) export restrictions, (ii) 
interventions to increase rice stocks and 
maintain strategic reserves, and (iii) plans 
to eventually implement price controls 
(Lao PDR, 2010). These measures are 
likely to have an uncertain impact on the 
rice market, largely because of lack of 
accurate information on production 
volumes, stocks, trade flows etc.   
 International experience indicates 
that trade restrictions, government 
storage and price controls might have 
inadvertently exasperated price 
volatilities, rather than limit it. Evidence 
from Sub-Saharan Africa shows that 
countries with relatively open and 
transparent trade and marketing policies, 
such as Mozambique and Uganda, had the 
lowest price variability. But countries that 
intervened regularly in a discretionary 
manner, such as Malawi and Zambia, had 
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the highest price volatility. The use of 
discretionary policy, which is inherently 
unpredictable, actively discourages 
production and trade. Moreover, in 
countries with few ad hoc interventions, 
such as Uganda, maize production grew 
rapidly, while it grew slowly in Malawi 
and Zambia (Chapoto and Jayne, 2010; 
Jayne and others, 2010). For Laos, 
market-friendly forward-looking actions 
to manage price risks could include: 
 
  Develop and implement a rice sector 
policy framework. The current high 
rice prices levels are an opportunity 
for rice sector development. Laos is a 
small economy and strengthening the 
rice sector is crucial. But Laos 
appears as one of the few countries in 
the region that does not have an 
operational rice sector strategy to 
fully develop its potential. The 
development of a policy framework 
could help to establish principles for 
production, commercialization, and 
trade policy decisions, and better 
coordinate Government and donor 
funding for the sector. An important 
element would be to better coordinate 
policy decisions at the national, 
provincial and district levels, and 
address knowledge gaps. The strategy 
should also be coordinated with 
national agricultural growth and 
regional trade liberalization 
objectives. 
 
 Better understand the regional market 
of glutinous rice in order to enhance 
implementation effectiveness of 
domestic policy measures. Estimates 
of actual cross-border trade flows 
between countries and characteristics 
of the regional glutinous rice market, 
including primary data collection on 
prices and trade flows, would be a 
useful first step. Relaxation of 
controls and provision of market 
access to farming communities could 
make Laos a net exporter of rice over 
and above just having a small 
incremental niche-market. Altogether, 
prudent trade and stock policies in 
Laos are hard to formulate and 
implement without such are regional 
market analysis. Currently none of 
such knowledge is available. 
 
 Restrain from intervening into the 
market mechanisms in the short-run. 
This is because households appear to 
gain on average from higher rice 
prices. However, some short-run 
measures may be warranted to address 
adverse distributional impacts of rice 
price inflation, targeted at poor 
households living in urban and food-
deficit areas. An important option 
would be to consider expanding social 
safety nets programs in Laos, such as 
food for work programs (World Bank, 
2009). Safety net programs would 
also help address the risks stemming 
from supply shocks and in the long 
run deal with climate change issues. 
 
 Continue to enhance national rice 
production in the long-run through 
public and private investments in the 
sector.  Achieving higher production 
targets and marketable surplus is in 
particular important in the light of 
high population growth, which is the 
main long-run determinant of rice 
consumption. With the Lao 
population growing at 2.2 percent per 
year, the demand for rice is expected 
to grow substantially over time, 
requiring substantial yield and 
production increases.  Moreover, still 
not all households are able to 
permanently meet their rice 
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consumption requirements. Enhancing 
national production requires 
systematically identifying and 
addressing bottlenecks for rice sector 
development. It also requires carefully 
prioritizing development needs and 
enabling donor coordination. The 
proposed rice sector policy 
framework would be a useful first 
step to initiate a comprehensive rice 
development program in Laos. 
 
 Establish an effective rice price 
monitoring system, which tracks both 
domestic and regional price, 
production and trade trends. Better 
information is necessary because 
there is little information to guide the 
policy makers on carrying out 
evidence-based market interventions 
in Laos. There is paucity of 
information about the production 
volumes, stocks in storage, formal and 
informal trade, and prices. All these 
information shortages hamper 
evidence-based policy interventions.  
 
 Be aware of long-run macroeconomic 
implications. There is a need to better 
understand how world food and 
energy prices affect price trends in 
Laos and in the region. Consumer 
price developments in Thailand and 
Vietnam can have significant impact 
on prices in Laos through price 
transmission. Rice and food price 
increases can eventually feed into 
domestic wages. And expectations 
can create inflationary pressures over 
time. Moreover, current price 
inflation is taking place in the context 
of already high private credit growth, 
which itself can contribute to 
inflationary pressures. All this 
justifies comprehensive monitoring of 
food price trends in Laos.  
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TECHNICAL ANNEX 
Data sources 
Lao rice price data were obtained from 
government agencies, complemented and 
verified with historical price data 
collected by the World Bank Lao country 
office, FAO and WFP staff, as well as 
information gathered by several 
researchers over time. The National 
Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce both collect price 
data. Data from the National Statistical 
Bureau is deemed more reliable, because 
of the Bureau’s more rigorous approach 
in generating the data. Meanwhile, data 
from the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce are mainly collected for policy 
monitoring purposes and publicly 
released, unlike the price data sourced 
from the National Statistical Bureau.  
Price information shows quality shifts 
at times and there are different time-series 
with slight revisions and outliers. Overall 
data management quality is poor. Despite 
these differences, prices seem to 
reasonably reflect market conditions. 
Household data are from the 2003 LECS3 
and 2008 LECS4 (Lao Expenditure and 
Consumption Surveys). The spatial data 
are from the Swiss-funded DECIDE 
project and mainly based on the 2005 
Population and Household Census.27 
Formal trade flows are from the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce. Data was 
crosschecked with qualitative evidence 
from field visits, several reports, 
discussions with government officials and 
the donor community. 
                                                 
27 See http://www.decide.la for details. 
Overview of rice sector studies 
Detailed studies on the Lao rice sector are 
scarce. This leads to a notion of a lack of 
reliable evidence of the functioning of the 
rice market. The few available reports, 
sometimes presentations, are often 
outdated or show conflicting findings.  
One of the most comprehensive 
pieces is from Schiller and others (2006). 
The book mainly discusses agro-
economic, social and anthropological 
issues of the rice sector.  
Moreover, quantitative evidence and 
technical analysis especially on the 
functioning of the rice market are 
likewise sparse. Majority of statistical and 
empirical evidence are obtained from 
unpublished reports. The key source of 
data is a rapid assessment survey from 
2008 technically and financially 
supported by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO/MAF, 2009). It presents rice sector 
statistics in the form presentational slides. 
Sengua et al (2009) employ such data 
along with other market information to 
provide a snapshot of the rice market. 
Another comprehensive analysis using 
actual rice price and production data is 
Bourdet (2000).  
The question of market integration 
has received some attention from several 
papers (van der Weide, 2006; Andersson 
et al, 2007; Takamatsu, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the findings of these studies 
are generally inconclusive and rarely 
address regional trade with neighboring 
countries. Market commercialization 
related to poverty and welfare is analyzed 
by Hill and Christiaensen (2006). Several 
studies tackle broader institutional and 
policy questions. These include an 
evaluation synthesis by the ADB (2006) 
and two consultant reports commissioned 
by the World Bank (EMC, 2011 and 
GSD, 2005). 
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Welfare impacts of rice inflation 
The seminal work of Deaton (1997) 
provides the methodological framework 
to estimate the short-run welfare impact 
of price changes. Rice price changes are 
proportional to the net benefit ratio 
(NBR). The net benefit ratio can be 
interpreted as the elasticity of real income 
with respect to price change. This ratio is 
the difference between the household 
production and consumption ratio: 
 
 
 
where Δw is the welfare effect expressed 
as percentage of original incomes of the 
household i, Δp is the percentage change 
of rice prices; PR is the rice production 
ratio; and CR is the rice expenditure ratio.  
Production and consumption data are 
from LECS4, using shares calculated by 
Davis and Baulch (2011). The total 
change of in relative rice prices from 
December 2009 to December 2010 is 40.6 
percent. The findings are summarized in 
Tables 2 and 1 (main text):  
(1) The overall average net welfare 
impacts of the increase in rice prices is 
marginally positive. The exception is the 
Northern region where, on average, 
increases in rice prices lead to a slight 
decline in household welfare. 
(2) Looking beyond averages, welfare 
effects seem to vary significantly by 
region and proximity to rice-producing 
areas in the Central and Southern 
provinces. The adverse impact of rice 
price hikes is moderate in urban 
households but is significant in remote 
rural households in the food-deficient 
Northern provinces are significantly 
negatively affected by a rice price 
increase. Areas where households 
produce rice surpluses generally gain 
from price increases.  
These calculations only approximate 
short-run welfare impacts, as the analysis 
does not capture second-order effects 
stemming from induced wage response. 
 iii CRPRpw 
Table 2: First-order household welfare impacts of rice inflation 
 
 
 
 
Region 
Household production and consumption            
(in percent) 
Estimated welfare impact    
(Dec 2009 to Dec 2010) 
Production 
ratio 
 
(PR) 
Consumption 
ratio 
 
(CR) 
Net sales of 
rice  
 
(NBR) 
First-order household 
welfare impact             
 
(in percent of initial 
household income) 
Vientiane 22.5 16.3 6.2 2.5 
North 31.8 32.2 -0.4 -0.1 
Central 39.0 31.6 7.3 3.0 
South 32.7 32.2 0.6 0.2 
     
Total 33.6 30.3 3.3 1.4 
Source: LECS4 data based on Davis and Baulch (2011) and staff calculations. 
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Due to data unavailability, these estimates 
do not account for the possibility of 
inflation differentials between rural and 
urban locations, or inflation differentials 
between household income groups. 
Despite these shortcomings, the overall 
findings are consistent with rice inflation 
analysis undertaken for Vietnam (Minot 
and Goletti, 2000; Glewe and Vu, 2009) 
and analysis for Laos during the global 
food crisis in 2006 to 2008 (World Bank, 
2009; Takamatsu, 2011). 
Spatial patterns of rice inflation 
All maps presented in this report display a 
continuous variation across space. The 
spatial price data are created from the 
2003 LECS3 and 2008 LECS4 household 
surveys. As there are only observations 
for a selected number of villages and 
towns, the maps are generated through 
spatial smoothing. The data y is on n 
different locations, which allows 
estimating y for each of the 10,035 
villages and towns by a spatially 
weighted average over the n locations. 
The greatest weight is given to 
observations closest to the village for 
which the missing data are imputed with 
the following formula: 
 
ݕො௜ ൌ ෍ݓ௜௝ݕ௝
௜ୀ௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
The weights sum up to 1, and decline 
as the travel time between i and j 
increases. There are no observations of 
the routes most popularly travelled 
between locations. Therefore routes are 
Table 3: Transmission of glutinous rice prices between Laos and Thailand 
   
 symmetric asymmetric symmetric asymmetric 
ܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ -0.113***  0.053**  
 (0.027)  (0.026)  
ܧܥ ௧ܶିଵା   -0.067  0.055 
  (0.042)  (0.041) 
ܧܥ ௧ܶିଵି   -0.188***  0.048 
  (0.059)  (0.057) 
 0.205*** 0.211*** 0.020 0.020 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) 
 0.129* 0.122* 0.401*** 0.0401*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) 
Constant 0.009** 0.002 0.008** 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Co‐integrating 
vector 
(1, -0.912) (1,-0.912) 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
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estimated by minimizing the travel time 
over all possible routes. After some 
experimentation, the final weights in the 
spatial smoothing regression equals the 
inverse of the travel time to the power 1.5 
which balances the trade-off between 
averaging sampling errors across n 
observations, and maintaining as much of 
the spatial variation in the underlying 
variable as possible. 
Asymmetric rice price transmission 
between Laos and Thailand 
The regression is done with glutinous rice 
prices from January 1990 to December 
2010 using data from the Lao and Thai 
national statistical offices. Thai prices are 
converted to Kip using the nominal 
effective exchange rate. An Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test 
confirms that the price series in both the 
Lao and the Thai market are integrated of 
order one, I(1). The estimated baseline 
error correction model with symmetric 
adjustments to equilibrium has the 
following form: 
 
∆ log൫݌௅௔௢,௧൯ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߩܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ
൅ ߜ௅௔௢∆ log൫݌௅௔௢,௧ିଵ൯
൅ ߜ௅௔௢∆ log൫݌்௛௔௜,௧ିଵ൯
൅ ݑ௧ 
 
 
Following Enders and Siklos (2001), 
incorporating asymmetric threshold 
adjustments to equilibrium, the error-
correction model becomes: 
 
∆ log൫݌௅௔௢,௧൯ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߩାܧܥ ௧ܶିଵା
൅ ߩିܧܥ ௧ܶିଵି
൅ ߜ௅௔௢∆ log൫݌௅௔௢,௧ିଵ൯
൅ ߜ௅௔௢∆ log൫݌்௛௔௜,௧ିଵ൯
൅ ݑ௧ 
 
For the asymmetric model the 
threshold value is set at zero. Price data 
are too limited to estimate a three-regime 
model, which would have allowed the 
identification of a transaction cost effect, 
in addition to the standard asymmetric 
adjustment effect. Table 3 presents the 
results, suggesting the following: 
(1) Thai glutinous rice prices 
Granger-cause Lao rice prices, suggesting 
that Thailand is the regional price setter. 
Also a separate Granger causality test 
assuming two lags confirms this finding 
(p < 0.001). 
(2) The Lao and Thai glutinous rice 
markets are co-integrated close to the 
one-percent level. In the long run there is 
almost perfect price transmission. A one 
percent increase of Thai prices increase 
Lao prices by 0.91 percent.  
 (3) Glutinous rice price transmission 
from Thailand to Laos is asymmetric. 
Adjustments following negative price 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
(high Thai prices) are faster than 
adjustments following positive price 
deviations (low Thai prices). The sign of 
the error-correction terms (ECT) have the 
expected opposite signs. They are 
negative for the Lao model, and positive 
for the Thai model. This is because when 
Lao prices experience a negative 
deviation from equilibrium, Thai prices 
experience a positive deviation from 
equilibrium, and vice versa. 
Overall, the results for Lao are 
consistent with findings on food 
commodity price transmissions in 
developing countries. Examples are rice 
price transmission between Nepal and 
India (Sanago and Amadou, 2010) and 
spatial price transmission in the Ghanaian 
maize market (Abdulai, 2000).  
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Volatility analysis between Lao and 
Thai rice prices 
Short-run price dynamics are analyzed by 
the means of generalized orthogonal 
generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GO-GARCH) model. 
The regression is done with glutinous rice 
prices from January 1990 to February 
2011 using data from the Lao and Thai 
Statistical Offices to estimate the model 
parameters (by means of maximum 
likelihood). The model is particularly 
suited to provide a volatility measure that 
can be used to understand the time-
varying linkage between price changes in 
the two markets, and the transmission of 
volatility from one market to the other.  
The data used for the estimation was 
first cleaned for first order auto-
correlation. Following the approach put 
forward by van der Weide (2002) and 
Boswijk and van der Weide (2011), the 
multivariate model has the following 
form: 
ݔ௧ ൌ ܼݑ௧ 
 
where Z denotes a non-singular matrix 
that links the observed data x (which is 
the bivariate time series cleaned from first 
order auto-correlation) and the latent 
bivariate process u that consists of two 
uncorrelated factors, each with 
expectation zero and conditional variance 
following a GARCH (1,1) dynamics: 
 
݄௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߙݑ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ݄௜,௧ିଵ  
ݓ݅ݐ݄ ݅ ൌ 1,2 
 
The GARCH (1,1) approach is often 
considered as the simplest and most 
robust of the family of volatility models. 
The main results of the analysis are 
Figure 15: Monthly time variation in conditional correlation and volatility between 
Lao and Thai glutinous rice prices 
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plotted in Figure 15. The following 
observations emerge: 
(1) The volatilities of Lao and Thai 
rice prices move in tandem in normal 
times, but not in abnormal times. Shocks 
that lead to spikes in volatility do not 
spread across the two markets. An 
example is the recent surge in Thai rice 
price volatility in 2010, while Lao 
volatility is low. The exact opposite 
occurred two years earlier in 2007.  
(2) Using conditional correlation as a 
proxy, one can see that the linkages 
between Lao and Thai rice markets have 
intensified significantly. In particular, the 
price data suggests that correlations have 
intensified since 2007. 
(3) A possible explanation why 
correlation rises in 2007, while volatility 
is not transmitted, could be market 
interventions implemented by the 
government. In particular, after pressure 
from farmers, Thailand started setting 
high minimum paddy prices in the middle 
of 2008 and simultaneously prevented 
rice imports from neighboring countries, 
including from Laos. 
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